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INTRODUCTION
[N]o one in the legal academy thinks it very important to explain [the
Privileges or Immunities Clause] ....
- J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson'
'[E]veryone' agrees the Court incorrectly interpreted the Privileges or
Immunities Clause ....
-

Richard L. Aynes 2

Could everyone be wrong?
We rely upon traditional canons of constitutional law to
distinguish significant clauses of the Constitution from the
insignificant ones. Today, almost everyone agrees that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause in the Fourteenth
Amendment, as authoritatively construed, belongs on the
insignificant list. Beginning with the first Supreme Court
interpretation of the Clause in 1873, 3 dissenting Justices and
critical scholars have ridiculed the Court's majority for
rendering the Clause "superfluous and redundant" 4 and merely
1. J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law,
111 HARV. L. REV. 963, 1020 (1998).
2. Richard L. Aynes, Constrictingthe Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 627, 627 (1994).
3. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
4.

GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

430 (13th ed. 1997).

Treatment of the issue changed slightly after the
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reinforcing a Supremacy Clause that had no need for additional
support. In often cited dissents, Justice Field accused the
Court of turning the Clause into a "vain and idle enactment,
which accomplished nothing,"5 and Justice Swayne argued that
the majority had "turn[ed] ...what was meant for bread into a
stone."6
William Crosskey agreed, labeling judicial
7
interpretation of the clause "completely nugatory and useless."
Charles Black blamed the Supreme Court for "annihilat[ing]"
the Clause and transforming it into a "cost-free blown kiss."
Robert Bork compared the Clause to a provision "written in
Sanskrit" or "obliterated past deciphering by an ink blot."9
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that "[n]o State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." 0
Periodically, scholars argue for revival of this clause. I
Supreme Court decided that, if nothing else, the Privileges or Immunities
Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment provided a textual basis for enforcing
the "right to travel." Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502-03 (1999) (holding that
states could not limit welfare benefits of new residents). This change,
however, offers a new pigeonhole for existing doctrine without considering
whether other elements of history or doctrine should be taken more seriously.
5. Slaughter-House,83 U.S. at 96 (Field, J., dissenting).
6. Id. at 129 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
7. 2 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN
THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1119 (1953).
8. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS,
NAMED AND UNNAMED 76 (1997).
9. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 166 (1990).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
11. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 181-230 (1998) (proposing and defending a "refined model of
incorporation" of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment); BLACK,
supra note 8, at 146-48 (explaining that the meaning of the phrase, "privileges
or immunities," has not changed with time); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO
STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF
RIGHTS (1986) (justifying the incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the
Fourteenth Amendment based on historical and judicial evidence); JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 28-30 (1980)
(observing that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was best interpreted as
protecting rights that the Constitution "neither lists ...
nor ...
gives
directions for finding"); DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE AND THE
CONSTITUTION: HISTORY, THEORY, AND LAW OF THE RECONSTRUCTION
AMENDMENTS 199-232 (1993) (discussing the potential importance of the role
of the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause in protecting
human rights, and justifying interpretation of the Clause to encompass such a
role); Philip B. Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities Clause: "Its Hour Come
Round at Last"?, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 405, 418-20 (exploring the possibility of
an increased role for the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities
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Starting with the premise that the Supreme Court erred, these
scholars attempt to reverse the course of history, either to
affect a recognition that protecting privileges or immunities
2
means enforcing the Bill of Rights against state governments,
13
or to advocate broad protection for economic liberties,
participatory rights,14 self governance,15 or fundamental rights
more broadly defined. 16 I agree with those who read the
historical record of the Privileges or Immunities Clause to
include incorporation of the Bill of Rights, but I offer a different
perspective. Rather than calling for a change of privileges or
immunities doctrine, I advocate taking the existing doctrine
seriously. 17
Clause in the future).
12. See, e.g., Michael Kent Curtis, Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and
Life after Death: The Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the United States,
78 N.C. L. REV. 1071, 1098-1124 (2000) (finding support in the historical
usage of "privilege" or "immunities").
13. See, e.g., Kimberly C. Shankman & Roger Pilon, Reviving the
Privileges or Immunities Clause to Redress the Balance Among States,
Individuals, and the Federal Government, 3 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 1, 44-48
(1998) (objecting to the loss of protection for "economic rights" and arguing
that revival of the natural law foundations of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause will secure individual liberty).
14. See Daniel J. Levin, Reading the Privileges or Immunities Clause:
Textual Irony, Analytical Revisionism, and an Interpretive Truce, 35 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 569, 571-74, 615 (2000) (arguing that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause should be relied upon to protect "structural privileges of
citizenship" and to "reunite political access doctrine").
15. See Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or
Immunities Revival Portend the Future-or Reveal the Structure of the
Present?, 113 HARV. L. REV. 110, 183-84 (1999).
16. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, WE THE PEOPLE: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE SUPREME COURT 68 (1999) (arguing that the Privileges
or Immunities Clause protects "every nonpoliticalright that a state creates");
James S. Gifford, Jus Cogens and Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or
Immunities: A Framework of Substantive, Fundamental Human Rights in a
Constitutional Safe-Harbor, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 481, 537-39 (1999)
(locating human rights protection in the Privileges or Immunities Clause).
17. This Article builds upon prior work. See 3 CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU
& WILLIAM J. RICH, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 44.85 (2d ed. 1997)
(noting that we should not lose sight of "the understanding that the
Fourteenth Amendment empowered Congress to pass remedial legislation
intended to enforce rights established not only by the Constitution directly,
but also by federal statutes enacted pursuant to congressional powers defined
more generally"); William J. Rich, Privileges or Immunities: The Missing Link
in Establishing Congressional Power to Abrogate State Eleventh Amendment
Immunity, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 235, 284-92 (2001) (explaining that
federal law establishes privileges or immunities of United States citizens that
override state Eleventh Amendment immunity); see also Vicki C. Jackson,
Holistic Interpretation:Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and Our Bifurcated Constitution,
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Two Supreme Court decisions bracket my assessment of
the doctrine. In the Slaughter-House Cases,18 the Supreme
Court construed the Fourteenth Amendment for the first time,
and Justice Miller's opinion for the Court directed future
generations to look to federal law to identify privileges or
immunities. 19 That admonition, however, had been all but
forgotten when, in 1999, the current Supreme Court used the
case of Saenz v. Roe20 to redirect attention to the Privileges or
In rejecting welfare laws that
Immunities Clause.
discriminated against new residents, the Justices found a home
for the "right to travel"21 in the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, emphasizing "the right of the newly arrived citizen to
the same privileges and immunities enjoyed by other citizens of
the same State."22 That decision, joined by seven Justices,
recognized state legislation as a source of "privileges" enjoyed
by bona fide state residents. 23 Both Slaughter-House and
Saenz link positive law with constitutional references to
"privileges" or "immunities," and together they set the stage for
reconsidering that relationship.
Looming in the background of this analysis is a series of
Supreme Court decisions imposing new constraints on federal
power. Current Supreme Court Justices have ruled that the
Eleventh Amendment, 24 or the principle of state sovereignty on
which it was based, 25 bars Congress from using Article I powers
to authorize individual actions for monetary damages against
state agencies that violate federal law. As a result, thousands
of state employees have lost substantial protection from state
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 26 the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act,27 and the Americans with
53 STAN. L. REV. 1259, 1304-06 (2001) (advancing the same proposition

"tentatively").
18.

83 U.S. 36 (1873).

19. Id. at 79.
20. 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (invalidating a California law that limited welfare
rights of new state residents).
21. Id. at 503.

22. Id. at 502.
23. Id. at 507.
24. The first case in this series of Supreme Court decisions was Seminole
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), which found the state immune

from enforcement of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. Id. at 47.
25. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712-13 (1999).
26. See id. (relieving states from private state court enforcement of the
Fair Labor Standards Act).
27.

See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000), cert. granted,
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Disabilities Act. 28 States have also been given a free pass to
violate the intellectual property rights of United States
29
citizens.
One feature of these cases stands out: The litigants failed
to ask, and the Justices therefore did not address, the question
of whether the federal laws at issue constituted privileges or
immunities of United States citizens, protected by a Fourteenth
Amendment that supersedes Eleventh Amendment state
immunity. That question will be raised in the following pages.
After reviewing the history of privileges or immunities, 30 this
Article will examine the implications of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause for three other, more fundamental
constitutional issues.
First, valuing the Privileges or Immunities Clause clarifies
31
the relationship between state and federal governments.
Federalism helps to preserve a political environment in which
citizens maintain access to government and make meaningful
choices about how they are governed. The Constitution of 1787
embraced this concept of federalism, leaving room for states to
claim independent sovereign rights. 32 In 1868, however, the
federal balance changed as the Fourteenth Amendment33
strengthened values of nationhood, equality, and democracy.
When federalism is at issue, the values of 1868 should be
predominant. Judges should respect the central importance of
national citizenship and democratic control, and legitimate
congressional action should override state sovereign immunity.
Second, the Privileges or Immunities Clause provides a
basis for resolving the perceived conflict between positive and
negative rights. 34 The former are viewed as necessary to
protect human dignity, but the Bill of Rights as traditionally

528 U.S. 1132 (2000), cert. dismissed, 528 U.S. 1184 (2000).
28. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001).

29. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav.
Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999) (holding that a patent statute expressly

removing state immunity from patent infringement suits could not be
sustained

as

a proper

enactment under

section 5

of the

Fourteenth

Amendment).
30.
31.
32.

See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.A.
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 288-94 (James Madison) (Clinton

Rossiter ed., 1961).
33. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, OUR SECRET CONSTITUTION: HOW LINCOLN
REDEFINED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 57-74 (2001).
34. See infra Part II.B.
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construed only protects the latter. A constitution "worthy of
respect" should find room for both, 35 and the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, properly understood, makes that possible.
Third, recognizing privileges or immunities also enables us
36
to appreciate the separate roles of Congress and the courts.
Congress should be given wide authority to develop the social
and economic environment of a flourishing society. Courts, on
the other hand, must ensure that the legislative and executive
branches do not overstep their bounds. In other words, the
legislative branch should be the primary source of positive
rights, leaving courts with the responsibility to impose
constitutional constraints.
The Fourteenth Amendment
embodies this balance of legislative and judicial responsibility.
In the pages that follow, this Article develops the thesis
that the Constitution empowers Congress to establish
privileges or immunities of United States citizens. History and
tradition support this thesis, but lawyers and scholars have
forgotten or ignored its basic thrust. Commentators have been
collectively blinded by assumptions that only those rights
generated and protected by the courts deserve to be taken
seriously, and therefore they have been unduly preoccupied by
debates about whether the Privileges or Immunities Clause
incorporated inherent rights that were enforceable through
direct judicial action. The text of the Constitution, as currently
construed, offers a simple and compelling alternative vision
that is worthy of inclusion in the canons of constitutional law.
I. INTRODUCING PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES
Several important background features of privileges or
immunities merit explanation. First, prior to ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, legislatures and courts often referred
to "privileges or immunities" but rarely defined the substance
of those terms. 37 Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
articulated a range of views regarding the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, including references to fundamental rights
and to solidification of federal supremacy. 38 When first asked
to construe that clause, the Supreme Court majority did not
35. See Frank I. Michelman, What (If Anything) is Progressive-Liberal
Democratic Constitutionalism?, 4 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 181, 194 (1999)
(explaining the need to "supplement constitutionalism with democracy").
36. See infra Part II.C.
37. See infra notes 38-57 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 60-82, 109-23 and accompanying text.
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address the issue of incorporating the Bill of Rights. 39 The
Justices did, however, recognize federal supremacy by
concluding that the privileges or immunities protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment were those owing "their existence to
the Federal government, its National character, its
Constitution, or its laws." 40 Subsequent cases, statutes, and
commentary have reinforced this doctrine, whether or not they
accorded it respect.
A. REVIEWING THE BACKGROUND
References to "privileges" and "immunities" became well
ingrained in American law long before the introduction of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Colonial charters commonly
protected some equivalent of the "liberties and immunities of
free and natural subjects."4' The Articles of Confederation
protected "all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the
several states" including "free ingress and regress" as well as
"all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same
duties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof
respectively." 42
Minor amendments were made to that
language before it appeared in Article IV of the United States
Constitution, promising that "[c]itizens of each State shall be
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
several States."43 In subsequent years, courts dealt with the
same general phrase in contexts as diverse as protecting
copyright claims 44 and determining the contractual rights of a
quartermaster who sought pay for unusual services. 45 Africans
aboard a Spanish ship, The Amistad, gained "the privileges,
and immunities, and rights belonging to bona fide subjects of
39.

See infra notes 139-46 and accompanying text.

40.
41.

The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 79 (1873).
See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 523 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting)

(quoting language from colonial charters in Virginia, New England,
Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maine, Maryland, Carolina, Rhode Island, and
Georgia).
42. ART. OF CONFED., art. IV, cl. 1 (1781).
43. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
44. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 606 (1834) (describing the
argument of counsel addressing copyright claims of the official reporter of
federal cases).
45. See United States v. Webster, 28 F. Cas. 509, 516 (D. Me. 1840) (No.

16,658) (denying repayment for services that were not payable pursuant to
either statute or usages and custom). In almost all cases, it could be fairly
implied that the phrase "privileges and immunities" was used as a reference to
existing common law or statutory rights. See Rich, supra note 17, at 244.
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Spain, under our treaties or laws," 46 but virtually no other
cases used "privileges and immunities" language to protect
individuals who lacked European ancestry. More typically,
slaveholders found refuge in the privileges and immunities
doctrine 47 whereas courts rejected claims for parity made by
African-Americans. 4 8 This trend culminated in the Supreme
Court's infamous decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford49 that
African-Americans, "whose ancestors were imported into this
country, and sold as slaves," were not entitled to the rights,
privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the United States
50
Constitution.
Most early nineteenth-century courts addressing questions
about the privileges and immunities doctrine reduced the issue
to whether the parties involved belonged to a protected
category. The only case giving significant attention to the
term's substantive content was Corfield v. Coryell,5 1 in which
Justice Bushrod Washington devoted a page of dictum to a
vague, and admittedly incomplete, 52 account of privileges and
immunities. Before concluding that the party who challenged
53
the statute had no right even to bring his cause of action,
Justice Washington expressed his approval of a statutory
scheme allowing seizure of boats of nonresidents who
54
unlawfully gathered oysters along the New Jersey coast.
Justice Washington's list of privileges and immunities included
"enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and
46.

United States v. The Schooner Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518, 595

(1841) (freeing slaves who had revolted while being transported to Cuba).
47. See, e.g., Johnson v. Tompkins, 13 F. Cas. 840, 855 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1833)
(No. 17,416) (upholding use of force by slave owners to seize their human

"property" in non-slave states because of their entitlement to "all the
privileges and immunities of citizens of any other states").
48. See, e.g., Costin v. Washington, 6 F. Cas. 612, 614 (C.C.D.C. 1821) (No.
3266) (concluding that laws imposing constraints and penalties on all "persons

of color" would not violate the Constitution).
49.

60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).

50. Id. at 403.
51. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230) (finding that collection of
oysters was not a privilege or immunity protected by Article IV, Section 2 of
the United States Constitution).
52. See id. at 552.
53. See id. at 555 (explaining that the owner of the boat could not bring a

trespass action to contest its seizure at a time when the boat had been leased
to another individual).

For additional discussion of the fundamental rights

and equal treatment elements of Justice Washington's opinion, see Rich, supra
note 17, at 241-44.
54. See Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552.
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possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain
happiness and safety, subject ...to such restraints as the
government may justly prescribe for the general good of the
whole." 55 The list, however, did not extend to the "grant of a cotenancy in the common property of the state, to the citizens of
all the other states."56 In keeping with the era in which he
wrote, Justice Washington's general language straddled the
worlds of natural law and positive law, failing to resolve
subsequent questions about the scope and nature of privileges
57
and immunities.
By the time members of Congress met to promulgate the
Fourteenth Amendment, debate had developed over whether
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2
should be construed as a source of inherent, fundamental rights
or instead as a right to comity that guaranteed the equal
58
application of rights to citizens and sojourners alike.
Depending upon how one interpreted Justice Washington's
reference to "those privileges and immunities which are, in
their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the
citizens of all free governments," 59 advocates of either
argument could have cited the text of Corfield for support. In
1868, the same year in which the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified, however, the Supreme Court ruled the state of sojourn
could, in effect, dictate the scope of Article IV privileges and
immunities. 60 References to "common rights of free citizens" or
"fundamental" rights were therefore qualified; a state could
deny all rights if the denial extended equally to its citizens and
citizens from other states. 6' In other words, by 1868 the
Supreme Court had determined that positive law would control.
With such a limited and confusing background, it may
seem strange that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
chose to place such emphasis on the phrase "privileges or
55. Id. at 551-52.
56. Id. at 552.
57. L. H. LaRue explains that antebellum conceptions of privileges and
immunities "did not clearly distinguish between fundamental rights and
equality rights." L. H. LaRue, Liberty, Equality, Privileges, Immunities: Lost
Knowledge 4-5 (Washington & Lee Public Law and Legal Theory Research
Paper
Series,
Working
Paper
No.
00-4,
2000),
available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstractid=247655 (Oct. 2000).

58.
59.
60.
61.

See
See
See
See

infra note 75.
Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551.
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180-81 (1868).
id.at 180.
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immunities." Close attention to the context of that debate,
however, helps to explain the choice of language.
B. UNDERSTANDING THE FRAMERS' PERSPECTIVE
The isolated group of delegates to the original constitution
enjoyed sustained conversation in their deliberations; the
62
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had no such luxury.
Instead, the bitter divisions of the Civil War and its aftermath
influenced the open debates on the floor of Congress. These
debates shed light on how the participants understood the
proposed text. Scholars who have studied the debates focus on
whether members of Congress intended to incorporate the Bill
of Rights or to enforce the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV.63 Without denigrating the importance of those
discussions, I will focus primarily on a third issue-an
explication of how the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or
Immunities Clause reinforces federal supremacy.
1. Incorporation of the Bill of Rights
For more than one hundred years, scholars have asked
whether protection of privileges and immunities meant that
provisions of the Bill of Rights had been made enforceable
against the states. The most compelling answer to that
question favors incorporation. Akhil Amar chronicles evidence
of such incorporation at length-as "a lover of mercy" resisting
the temptation to detail every supporting piece of
information-and concludes that the congressional debate
"clinches the case for some sort of incorporation."64 After
repeated examinations of this issue, Michael Kent Curtis
65
reaches the same result.
A familiar challenge to the incorporation argument asks: If
Congress meant to incorporate the Bill of Rights, why did the
Fourteenth Amendment not include clear language to that

62.
63.
64.
65.

See Curtis, supra note 12, at 34-35.
See supra notes 12 and 14.
See AMAR, supra note 11, at 186.

See CURTIS, supra note 11, at 215-20; Curtis, supra note 12, at 1147.
But see Raoul Berger, Incorporationof the Bill of Rights: A Reply to Michael

Curtis' Response, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1983); Charles Fairman, Does the
Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original
Understanding,2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 132 (1949) (concluding that the Privileges
or Immunities Clause was not intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights).
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effect? 66 The most obvious answer to that question, consistent
with the analysis of both Amar and Curtis, is that the framers
of the Amendment had in mind a more inclusive conception of
privileges or immunities. Whether or not one accepts an
incorporationist view of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, it
is clear that those who promulgated the Fourteenth
Amendment viewed the Privileges or Immunities Clause as an
important protection of national authority with respect to
issues and concerns beyond those that the first eight
amendments controlled.
2. Enforcement of Article IV
A second debate regarding the intended scope of privileges
or immunities protection focuses on the relationship between
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV, Section 2.67 The congressional debates
made numerous references to Article IV, implying that the
Fourteenth Amendment would give Congress authority to
enforce the privileges and immunities that the Clause
conferred. 68 In particular, members of Congress referred to
Justice Washington's opinion in Corfield v. Coryel169 as they
attempted to explain the substantive scope of privileges or
immunities. 70 Those references, however, do little to quell
debate about what such enforcement might entail.
As

66. See, e.g., D.O. McGovney, Privilegesor Immunities Clause, Fourteenth
Amendment, 4 IOWA L. BULL. 219, 233 (1918).
67. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM
POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 114-24 (1988); Michael Kent
Curtis, FurtherAdventures of the Nine Lived Cat: A Response to Mr. Berger on
Incorporationof the Bill of Rights, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 89 (1982) (arguing that the

Fourteenth Amendment incorporates a range of rights set out in the
Constitution).
68. The initial draft of the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or
Immunities Clause duplicated the language of Article IV. See CONG. GLOBE,

39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866). In a subsequent draft, the text was
modified to refer to "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States."
Id. at 2286.
69. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
70. At least eighteen separate references to Corfield can be found in
debates involving the Fourteenth Amendment and related enforcement acts.
See THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES: THE LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN CONGRESS ON THE 13TH, 14TH, AND
15TH AMENDMENTS 121-122, 128, 152, 181, 207, 219, 248, 466, 468, 494, 528,
540, 557, 626, 659, 664, 674, 679 (Alfred Avins ed., 1967) [hereinafter
DEBATES].
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previously noted, 7 1 the Corfield opinion fails to resolve
arguments about whether the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV provided inherent protection of
fundamental rights or merely extended comity to citizens from
one state traveling to another. The Fourteenth Amendment
72
debates reflected both perspectives.
Courts have consistently rejected claims that the Privileges
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment gave the
federal government-either Congress or the courts-the
authority to determine the substantive scope of all privileges
and immunities included in Justice Washington's litany. 73 In
spite of some historical ambiguity on the issue, ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment did not give the federal
government general supervisory authority over areas such as
74
contract law or property law. The Slaughter-HouseCases put
this matter to rest.
Questions about the interpretation or enforcement of
Article IV affected the development of the Fourteenth
Amendment in other significant ways. Congressional debates
reveal that some members of Congress were less concerned
about the power to establish the substance of privileges or
immunities than with ensuring that the federal government
had the authority to enforce the equality component of Article
IV. 75 In the years leading up to the Civil War, courts had
seized upon the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause as
a tool for the enforcement of slavery. White slaveholders were
generally entitled to the protection of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause; 76 blacks were not. 77 Despite notable
71. See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
72. Compare CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement
of Sen. Howard that the Privileges or Immunities Clause, including rights
identified in Corfield, would "put the citizens of the several States on an
equality with each other as to all fundamental rights"), with CONG. GLOBE,

42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 189 (1871) (statement of Rep. Willard that the
rights Justice Washington identified as belonging to a citizen were understood
to be "in subordination to the laws of the State in which he may happen to
be").
73. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23 (1883) (finding that
Congress lacked Fourteenth Amendment authority to address private acts of
discrimination).
74. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78-79 (1873).
75. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866) (statement
of Rep. Bingham).
76. See Johnson v. Tompkins, 13 F. Cas. 840, 850 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1833) (No.
7416) (upholding the use of force by slave owners to seize their "property" in
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exceptions, 78 the dominant question in these cases was not
"substantive," but rather whether blacks were entitled to the
79
same privileges or immunities as whites.
This issue could be restated in terms of racial comity:
When blacks traveled away from their home state, were they
entitled to be treated with the same respect as all other
citizens? 8 0 In the course of the congressional debates, framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment denounced the Supreme Court
ruling in Dred Scott8 l and made frequent references to other
incidents in which African-Americans had been denied equal
treatment by state authorities.8 2 The Citizenship Clause,
making "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof... citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside,"8 3 effectively
overturned the Dred Scott ruling, but did not eliminate
questions about race discrimination. For example, in another
infamous judicial ruling, a federal court concluded that as long
as all persons of color were similarly discriminated against,
regardless of their state of origin, they could not claim to have
been denied the protection of Article IV.84 An equality
rationale would undermine that ruling. Such a rationale would
non-slave states because of their entitlement to "all the privileges and
immunities of citizens of any other states").
77. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403 (1857).

78. A shift from comity to substance took place, however, when courts
elevated the "property interest" in slaves to a privilege protected by Article IV.
See Johnson, 13 F. Cas. at 855 (ruling that the Privileges and Immunities
Clause protected the property rights of a New Jersey slaveowner who claimed
possession of an allegedly fugitive slave).

79.

See, e.g., Costin v. Washington, 6 F. Cas. 612, 614 (C.C.D.C. 1821) (No.

3266). For additional discussion, see Rich, supra note 17, at 247-49.
80. See, e.g., John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1422-24 (1992) (arguing that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause prohibited discrimination in allocation of state-created

rights).
81. Members of Congress repeatedly referred to this case during
congressional debates. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1116
(1866) (Rep. Wilson of Iowa noting the "monstrosities of that decision"); id. at
1263 (Rep. Broomall denouncing the holding that a "negro has no rights which
a white man is bound to respect").
82. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 101-10 (referring to the arrest
of a black seaman in the harbor of Charleston, South Carolina); infra text

accompanying notes 108-12 (discussing the debate regarding the admission of
Oregon to the Union with a constitutional provision barring entry by AfricanAfricans).
83. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1.
84. See Costin, 6 F. Cas. at 614.
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also be consistent with the goal of securing congressional
authority to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which extended
citizenship to blacks and guaranteed them full and equal
benefit of all provisions for the security of person and
85
property.
I do not challenge that interpretation, nor do I question the
importance of principles of equality to those who framed the
Fourteenth Amendment. These arguments do not, however,
complete our review of how the framers understood the phrase
"privileges or immunities." Another significant, but generally
neglected, relationship between Article IV and the Fourteenth
Amendment involves an inquiry into whether the Constitution
empowered Congress to enforce Article IV constraints
independent of any control over its substance. Nothing in the
text of the Constitution gives Congress the authority to impose
the Constitution's textual constraints on states. Without that
authority, Congress could not provide relief for those whose
rights to privileges and immunities had been violated, nor
could it impose liability on those who interfered with such
rights. The importance of this issue of federal power to those
who framed the Fourteenth Amendment merits elaboration,
including a review of events that transpired in the years
leading up to the Civil War.
3. Federal Supremacy
In the first half of the nineteenth century, few
constitutional issues overshadowed the efforts of advocates of
states' rights to nullify federal law.
Use of the term
"nullification" could be traced to Thomas Jefferson's original
draft of the Kentucky Resolution,8 6 written to rally opposition
to Federalists in the election of 1800.87 John C. Calhoun,
however, led a South Carolina contingent to a much more
85. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 30 (2d ed. 1997) (arguing
that "all are agreed" that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to
'embody and protect" the Civil Rights Act of 1866); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT

346-49 (1985) (noting intentions of

providing a constitutional basis for the Civil Rights Act of 1866).
86. See RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE UNION AT RISK: JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY,
STATES' RIGHTS, AND THE NULLIFICATION CRISIS 9 (1987) (noting that, in
1832, states' rights advocates discovered and published Jefferson's original
draft of the Kentucky Resolution, which used the term "nullification").
87. See id. at 4 (explaining that states' rights advocates cast their position
as a "legal procedure" for nullification).
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extreme conception of state nullification than the one Jefferson
briefly espoused. Rather than arguing for dual sovereignty,
"nullifiers" advocated an ultimate state sovereignty susceptible
only to constitutional amendment. 88 Their arguments stemmed
in part from a significant gap in the text of the Constitution
that, while providing for federal supremacy, did not explicitly
allocate power to either Congress or the Supreme Court to
determine whether the federal government had exceeded its
authority. On the floor of the United States Senate, South
Carolina Senator Robert Hayne challenged Daniel Webster to
identify where the Constitution gave the federal government
"power of deciding ultimately and conclusively upon the extent
of its own authority."89 Webster responded by noting "that the
laws of Congress are made supreme; and that the judicial
power extends, by express words, to the interpretation of these
laws." 90 But Webster's oration failed to convince supporters of
nullification.
Arguments for the power to nullify federal law were
coupled with claims to a right of secession, provoking what
historians have called "the most serious constitutional crisis to
take place in the United States in the period between the
adoption of the Constitution and the Civil War."9'
The
nullification crisis pitted President Andrew Jackson against his
first term vice-president, Calhoun of South Carolina, who
supported nullification. The South Carolina Ordinance of
Nullification barred compliance with the Federal Tariff Acts of
1828 and 1832, prohibited appeals to the United States
Supreme Court, and declared that federal coercion would
provoke secession. 92 When the South Carolina Governor called
for raising an army of 12,000, President Jackson countered by
threatening to hang the leading nullifiers as traitors, and
reinforced the military stationed in and around Charleston as
evidence of his resolve. 93 Congress defused the crisis by
engineering a compromise that gave South Carolina much of
the tariff reform it had sought. 94 Although the congressional
compromise resolved the immediate crisis, it merely postponed
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 8.
6 REG. DEB. 86 (1830).
Id. at 93.
ELLIS, supra note 86, at 12.

92. Id. at 75-76.
93. Id. at 76-79.
94. Id. at 168-69.
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the Civil War, while fueling resentments leading up to that
conflict.
A second issue of states' rights coincided with the
confrontation between Jackson and Calhoun. In 1832, the
Supreme Court ruled that the laws of Georgia had no effect on
the Cherokee Nation, and that the United States government
had the sole right to regulate relations with the Indian
Georgia reacted defiantly, insistent upon its
nations. 95
authority over Cherokee lands, and its defiance underscored
the point that many states' rights advocates questioned
Supreme Court authority over federal-state relations. 96 As in
97
South Carolina, compromise averted a constitutional crisis.
In this case, two missionaries who were being prosecuted by
the state for living on Cherokee land accepted a pardon from
the Georgia governor rather than continuing to pursue their
Supreme Court authority emerged technically
claims. 98
unscathed, in spite of the substantial doubts that had been
raised regarding the Court's enforcement powers. 99 For the
Cherokee Nation, a Trail of Tears signaled retreat from
Georgia, and mocked Chief Justice Marshall's description of the
relationship between the Indians and the federal government
as that of"a ward to his guardian." 10 0
In yet another challenge to federal authority, South
Carolina officials seized and imprisoned black seamen who
entered Charleston harbor.10 1 On behalf of the seamen, Judge
Samuel Hoar traveled as an emissary from Massachusetts to
Charleston to argue that the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of Article IV protected all Massachusetts citizens, regardless of
race.10 2 Shortly after his arrival, state officials informed Hoar
95. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
96. ELLIS, supra note 86, at 115.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 118-19.
99. The apocryphal comment attributed to President Jackson was: "John
Marshall made his decision, now let him enforce it." Id. at 31.
100. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
101. See WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR: THE
NULLIFICATION CONTROVERSY IN SOUTH CAROLINA 1816-1836, at 112-16

(1966).
102. See Philip M. Hamer, Great Britain, the United States, and the Negro
Seamen Acts, 1822-1845, 1 J. S. HIST. 3, 22 (1935); see also WILLIAM M.
WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA,

1760-1848, at 132-40 (1977) (describing a series of confrontations over the
Negro Seamen Acts, including an opinion by then Attorney General Roger
Taney that a state's police powers overrode the federal government's treaty
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that his life could not be protected, and the South Carolina
legislature ordered his expulsion. 1°3 In response to this affair,
other southern states, including Georgia and Louisiana, rose to
defend South Carolina's efforts to protect "the exercise of their
10 4
sovereign rights."
The confrontation in Charleston fueled congressional
debates. In an 1849 discussion about slavery in Washington,
D.C., Congressman Ashmun took up Judge Hoar's argument
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV
protected both black and white citizens from the north when
they ventured into southern ports: "[Every Massachusetts
citizen] was as much entitled to protection, if he was black, as
any white man on this floor could be." 0 5 Congressman Hudson
added that he was angered not only by the fact that South
Carolina had imprisoned a Massachusetts citizen, but also
because the State of South Carolina had blocked appeal of that
decision to the United States Supreme Court. 0 6 From the
beginning, references to the Hoar affair implicated not only the
substantive rights of a black seaman and the Massachusetts
judge who traveled to defend him, but also the underlying issue
of national government authority to protect those rights. 10 7 As
Congressman Broomall explained,
[s]trange as it may seem, while the Government of the United States
has been held competent to protect the lowest menial of the minister
of the most obscure prince in Europe, anywhere between the two
oceans, and from the Lakes to the Gulf, it had no power to protect the
personal liberty of the agent of the State of Massachusetts
10 8 in the city
of Charleston, or enable him to sue in the State courts.

Members of Congress who supported the Fourteenth
Amendment began their political careers immersed in the
series of state sovereignty claims that had provoked
constitutional crises in the years leading up to the Civil War.
making power).
103. Hamer, supra note 102, at 22-23.
104. Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentions of the Framers:
The Limits of HistoricalAnalysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 389 (1989).
105. CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 2d Sess. 419 (1849).
106.

Id.

107. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1263 (1866) (discussing
enactment of the Civil Rights Bill). Akhil Amar cites the Hoar affair as
evidence that the framers of the Privileges or Immunities Clause intended to
protect the right to free speech. AMAR, supra note 11, at 236. References to
the Hoar affair also implied that members of Congress were seeking to
establish federal supremacy.
108. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1263 (1866).
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Congressman John Binghman, the person most responsible for
framing the Fourteenth Amendment and guiding it through the
House of Representatives, cared deeply about these issues. In
1857, he tried in vain to convince the House of Representatives
to deny Oregon admission to the United States because of a
clause in its proposed state constitution excluding entry by
African-Americans, stating: "I deny that any State may exclude
a law abiding citizen of the United States from coming within
its Territory ...or from the enjoyment therein of the 'privileges
and immunities' of a citizen of the United States." 10 9 Despite
Binghman's efforts, he lost his argument that the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution precluded such state laws." 10
The Civil War itself overshadowed all of these events as
brothers battled over questions about national authority to
regulate slavery. Again, this time in the midst of a debate
about funding the Union Army, Congressman Bingham
stressed the importance of federal supremacy: "The Republic
can no more live without its supreme law duly obeyed or duly
enforced than can its citizens who compose it live without
air."' II
In a debate that took place on February 26, 1866,
Congressman Bingham argued that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment
that he had authored protected the same rights found in the
text of Article IV, other existing constitutional provisions, and
the Supremacy Clause. 112 The only new ingredient was
congressional power to enforce those provisions. 113 Two days
later, as part of the same debate, Bingham again emphasized
the defiance of federal law that had taken place in Oregon and
throughout the southern states.'14 Congressman Rogers, an
opponent of the Amendment, agreed that "guarantees,
privileges, and immunities are not powers, and when the
Constitution authorized Congress to make all laws necessary
and proper to carry into execution the powers vested in the
Government, it meant powers strictly." 1 5 Congressman Hale,
109.

CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984 (1859).

110. Id. at 1010-11 (rejecting Bingham's substitute motion and voting to
approve admission of Oregon).
111.

CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 345 (1862).

112.
113.
114.
115.

CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866).
Id.
Id. at 1090.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 135 (1866).
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a New York moderate and former judge,16 added to the broad
consensus on this point, explaining that the constitutional text
"limited [congressional authority] directly to these [Article I,
Section 8] powers; it is not a general power to enact all laws for
carrying out the provisions of the Constitution." ' 17 In other
words, nothing in the body of the Constitution authorized
Congress to order state compliance with constitutional
obligations."18
Debate participants understood that the
Fourteenth Amendment would secure congressional authority
to enforce all elements of federal law.
Members of Congress made additional references to this
concern for federal supremacy during the course of debates over
the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, in addressing
questions about enforcement of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, Congressman Baker quoted the text of that provision
and asked:
What business is it of any State to do things here forbidden? To rob
the American citizen of rights thrown around him by the supreme law

of the land? When we remember to what an extent this has been
done in the past, we can appreciate the need of putting a stop to it in
the future.' 19

In historical context, Baker's reference would have been
understood as an appeal to reinforce federal supremacy. That
element of the debate was rarely extended because it was never
seriously challenged. The nullifiers had been vanquished, and
no one questioned whether, after the Civil War, state
sovereignty could independently override enforcement of
20
federal law. 1
116.
117.
118.

DEBATES, supra note 70, at viii.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1064 (1866).
The Supreme Court, however, found implied congressional authority

to enforce the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV with its
controversial decision in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842),
where it upheld congressional authorization of southern slave owners to
enforce fugitive slave laws in northern states. Id. at 625. Abolitionists had
argued against the Supreme Court opinion in Prigg, and committed
themselves to the position that Congress lacked implied enforcement power
extending beyond Article I of the Constitution. See JACOBUS TENBROEK, THE
ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 37 (1951). As a
result, opponents of slavery could have understood a particular need to
reinforce federal supremacy.

119. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 256 (1866).
120. In the words of Kenyon Bunch, "a constitution-amending majority"
readily accepted this proposition.
Kenyon D. Bunch, The Original
Understanding of the Privileges and Immunities Clause: Michael Perry's
Justificationfor JudicialActivism or Robert Bork's ConstitutionalInkblot?, 10
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The issue remained important enough, however, for
Congressman Bingham to emphasize it in his final speech
before the House of Representatives supporting promulgation
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 121 Bingham again referred to
South Carolina's interference with enforcement of national
law.' 22 When that event took place, a "body of great and
patriotic men looked in vain for any grant of power in the
Constitution" that would protect South Carolina residents who
sought to "bear true allegiance to the Constitution and laws of
the United States."1 23 He argued that states should never again
be allowed to "abjure their allegiance" to the United States by
attempting to "nullify" federal law. 124 In Bingham's view,
adopting the Privileges or Immunities Clause meant, at a
minimum, that questions about federal supremacy had been
put to rest.
4. Summarizing the Framers' Views
Congressional debates suggest that the framers chose
broad language because they anticipated multiple, related
applications of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. First, as
both Michael Kent Curtis and Akhil Amar have documented at
length, 125 arguments could be made for incorporating the Bill of
Rights. Arguments could also be made that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause transferred substantive protection for
traditional common law "privileges and immunities" from
states to the federal government, or that the purpose of the
Clause was to assure that all persons, regardless of race,
enjoyed equal protection of their privileges and immunities. 26
Finally, without necessarily rejecting any of these arguments,
protection of privileges or immunities of United States citizens
reinforced national supremacy of rights derived from the
Constitution or from federal law. 27 A review of the historical
context and congressional debates confirms this understanding.

SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 321, 416 (2000) (arguing that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause should only be given a meaning that is agreeable to a
constitutional-amending majority of enactors).
121.

CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866).

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id. at 2542-43.
Id. at 2542.
See AMAR, supra note 11, at 183-85; CURTIS, supra note 11, at 57-130.
See supra notes 67-85 and accompanying text.

127.

See supra text accompanying notes 86-123.
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As explained in the following section, the Supreme Court
explicitly accepted this final argument in the Slaughter-House
28
Cases.1
C. AFFIRMING SLAUGHTER-HOUSE

If scholars have agreed that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause failed to significantly enlarge the scope of federal
protection of individual rights, they normally blame SlaughterHouse for that failure. 129 By a vote of five-to-four, the Court
rejected arguments that the Fourteenth Amendment protected
property rights of a group of butchers in New Orleans to
continue their trade without having to relocate to a prescribed
130
location owned and managed by a state-created corporation.
The majority ruled that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
only protected rights that "owe their existence to the Federal
government, its National character, its Constitution, or its
laws." 131 Amazing twists of constitutional fate distorted this
language so that Slaughter-House came to be known as one of
the Supreme Court's historic blunders.
Liberal scholars decry the Court's failure to protect
individual rights, 132 as if oblivious of the fact that, by
contemporary liberal standards, the Court reached the correct
decision.
Simultaneously, conservative authors advocate
overruling Slaughter-House to resurrect theories of economic
liberty. 33 This joint chorus of liberals and conservatives

128. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
129. Charles Black characterized the Supreme Court holding in SlaughterHouse as "probably the worst holding, in its effect on human rights, ever
uttered by the Supreme Court." BLACK, supra note 8, at 55.
130. Slaughter-House,83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 78.
131. Id. at 79.
132. See, e.g., James E. Fleming, Constitutional Tragedy in Dying: Or
Whose Tragedy Is
It,
Anyway?, in
CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES,
CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 162, 162 (William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Sanford
Levinson eds., 1998) (labeling Slaughter-House as a "decision that has
disastrous consequences for interpretive method"); Aynes, supra note 2, at 627
(asserting that "everyone' agrees the Court incorrectly interpreted the
Privileges or Immunities Clause").
133. See, e.g., Shankman & Pilon, supra note 13, at 40-48. Michael Kent
Curtis reported that the Institute of Justice convened a conference to consider
overruling Slaughter-House, quoting Justice Scalia on the "urgent" need to

find constitutional protection for economic liberties.

Michael Kent Curtis,

Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause and Revising the SlaughterHouse Cases without Exhuming Lochner: Individual Rights and the
FourteenthAmendment, 38 B.C. L. REV. 1, 2 (1996).
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contributes to the impression that "everyone" rejects the ruling
of the Slaughter-House majority. 3 4 Unfortunately, scholars
have tended to ignore an important exception to this seeming
consensus: Since 1873, the Supreme Court has never seriously
35
questioned its historical judgment. 1
1. Context of the Decision
To understand the Slaughter-House Cases, it is important
to clarify the context in which the cases arose. Existing
doctrinal constraints helped to limit the scope of the Court's
opinion. The political background and ideological vision of the
litigants may also have had a significant impact on the
opinions of the justices and on subsequent reactions to their
decision.
136
The 1868 Supreme Court decision in Paul v. Virginia
established doctrinal boundaries for the Slaughter-House
Cases.137 Writing on behalf of the Court, Justice Field
explained that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV, Section 2 did not create substantive rights, but only
protected those rights bestowed by a state upon its own
people. 138 Justice Miller, who authored the fateful majority
opinion in Slaughter-House, sought an interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment parallel to the interpretation bestowed
upon Article IV. He argued that the rights of United States
134.

See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 522 n.1 (1999) (Thomas, J.,

dissenting) (noting that "scholars agree on little beyond the conclusion that
the Clause does not mean what the Court said it meant in 1873"). But cf
supra note 4.
135. This reaffirmation appeared most recently in Saenz. See Saenz, 526

U.S. at 503 (referring to Slaughter-House for the proposition that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause protects the right of interstate travel). For
one brief interlude, the Supreme Court arguably deviated from a strict
adherence to the Slaughter-House framework. See Colgate v. Harvey, 296
U.S. 404, 432 (1935) (relying upon the Privileges or Immunities Clause to
invalidate a Vermont tax that discriminated against out-of-state investments).
That decision was quickly overruled, and the court again limited privileges or

immunities to those which "grow out of the relationship of United States
citizens to the national government." Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 91
n.4, 93 (1940).
136. 75 U.S. 168 (1868).
137. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
138. Paul, 75 U.S. at 180 (concluding that a grant of corporate privileges

need not be extended to citizens from other states); see also Downham v.
Alexandria Council, 77 U.S. 173, 175 (1870) (noting "ilt
is only equality of
privileges and immunities between citizens of different States that the
Constitution guarantees").
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citizens protected by the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or
Immunities Clause derive from federal law in the same way
that the privileges and immunities protected by Article IV arise
out of positive state law. Proceeding from this analogy, Miller
concluded that the substantive scope of privileges or
immunities of United States citizens should be determined by
rather than by judicial
reference to federal sources of law
139
enforcement of new inherent rights.
The federal sources of law to which Justice Miller referred
could have included the Bill of Rights, but Miller did not need
to face that issue in order to resolve the claims that were before
him. The plaintiffs did not present a substantial argument
that Louisiana had violated any of the first eight amendments
to the Constitution when the state required the New Orleans
butchers to relocate and to do business within a state-created
location. The Due Process Clause was mentioned only in
passing, 140 and counsel for the butchers did not seriously argue
that the Louisiana law violated the Bill of Rights.
Instead of arguing for incorporation, opponents of the
slaughter-house monopoly argued, in effect, that the Privileges
or Immunities Clause transformed the Supreme Court into a
general guardian of the contract and property rights to which
Justice Washington had referred in Corfield, protecting not
only "equality of privileges," but other rights as well.' 41 Both
plaintiffs' counsel 42 and Justice Field, in his dissent, based
their arguments directly upon Adam Smith's economic theory
supporting the "right of free labor." 143 Quoting the Connecticut
Supreme Court, Field wrote, "[A]lthough we have no direct
constitutional provision against a monopoly,... the whole
theory of a free government is opposed to such grants, and it
does not require even the aid which may be derived from the

139. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 76-79 (1873).
140. See id. at 80 (noting that an argument that plaintiffs had been
deprived of their property without due process had "not been much pressed in
these cases"); id. at 118-19 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (referring to the Bill of
Rights and, in particular, to the Due Process Clause, as "among the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States").
141.

Id. at 118 (Bradley, J., dissenting).

142. See id. at 45-46 (argument of plaintiffs' counsel); 21 L.Ed. 394, 396
(citing ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, p. 1, ch. X, part II).
143. See id. at 110 (Field, J., dissenting) (citing ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS, p. 1, ch. X, part II, to support arguments that the Constitution
protected a general right to engage in free enterprise).
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Justice Miller recognized that the plaintiffs' arguments
would have led to a major shift in state and federal
relationships. Congress and the Supreme Court would become,
in Miller's terms, the "perpetual censor" of the state
legislatures. 145 Miller explained that the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment had not intended such a dramatic
147
change. 146 Consistent with Washington's Corfield opinion,
Miller's opinion for the Court protected community rights to
remove "noxious slaughter-houses" from city centers and to
generally protect the "convenience, health, and comfort of the
people." 148 Although less eloquent, Miller's opinion for the
majority in Slaughter-House reached the same conclusion that
Justice Holmes famously offered a generation later with his
149
dissent in Lochner v. New York.
Since the dissenters in Slaughter-House analogized to
those grounds eventually accepted by the Supreme Court in
Lochner, it seems inconsistent for the prevailing "constitutional
canon" to respect the Slaughter-House dissent and revile the
Lochner majority. Presumably, the unsavory character of the
slaughter-house monopoly holders, who won their status
through bribes to a corrupt reconstruction legislature, made
their legal victory difficult to swallow. In the deliberations
leading up to the Supreme Court decision, the trial judge had
referred to "monstrous and degrading" proceedings that had
been "so pernicious in their influence on the legislation of the
Country." 150 A falling-out among thieves occurred shortly after
the Supreme Court's decision when neglected participants in
the slaughter-house scheme sued to recover their share of the

144. Id. at 108-09 (quoting Norwich Gaslight Co. v. Norwich City Gas Co.,
25 Conn. 19, 38 (1856)).
145. Id. at 78.
146. Id.

147. Remember that Justice Washington explicitly conditioned the rights
to which he referred by "such restraints as the government may justly
prescribe for the general good of the whole." Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546,
552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
148. Slaughter-House,83 U.S. at 64.
149. 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905).
150. Mitchell Franklin, The Foundations and Meaning of The
Slaughterhouse Cases, 18 TUL. L. REV. 1, 24 (1943) (quoting Supreme Court

Transcript at 405, Durbridge v. The Slaughterhouse Company, 27 La. Ann.
676 (1875)).
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expected bounty. 15 1 The Supreme Court of Louisiana found
evidence of bribery in both houses of the Louisiana legislature,
and furthermore determined that the Governor's
signature had
52
been "obtained by the same soft powder."
Another element of the intrigue and confusion surrounding
Slaughter-House has to do with the lawyers who argued the
case to the Supreme Court. John A. Campbell, a former
Supreme Court justice who had helped uphold slavery in Dred
Scott, 153 appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs. Campbell had
resigned his judicial appointment out of southern loyalty, and
he held a confederate subcabinet position during the Civil
War. 54 He had been a disciple of John C. Calhoun and a strong
advocate of states' rights.' 55 In contrast, defending the
Slaughter-Housemonopoly was a group of prominent Louisiana
lawyers who, earlier in their careers, had gained international
attention for their opposition to secession. 156 One of the
lawyers had what has been described as a "passionate personal
attachment to Daniel Webster." The group had even organized
an armed force to support President Jackson's anti-nullification
57
efforts.
Campbell attempted to use defeat in the Civil War to his
advantage. He argued that the "doctrine of the 'States-Rights
party,' led in modern times by Mr. Calhoun, was, that there
was no citizenship in the whole United States .... The
Fourteenth amendment struck at, and forever destroyed, all
such doctrines." 158 He asked the Court to recognize an
151. Id.
152. Id. at 25 (quoting Supreme Court Transcript at 406, Durbridge).
153. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 493-518 (1857) (Campbell, J.,
concurring). Campbell stated a theory of state supremacy over "property," id.
at 515, and denounced congressional claims of "supreme and irresponsible
power ... over boundless territories," id. at 511.
154. See Jane L. Scarborough, What if the Butchers in the Slaughter-House
Cases Had Won?: An Exercise in "Counterfactual"Doctrine, 50 ME. L. REV.

211, 216 n.21 (1998).
155. See Franklin, supra note 144, at 88 (citing RANDELL HUNT, SELECTED
ARGUMENTS, LECTURES AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF RANDELL HUNT,

xviii-xix (1876)).
156. See Franklin, supra note 150, at 52.
157. Id. The creation of the slaughter-house monopoly can also be
explained as an element of grand unionist plans to strengthen the national
economy by streamlining commerce along the Mississippi River. Id. at 43-45.
As Franklin explains, this theory rested on "capitalistic rather than slave
production." Id. at 45.
158. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 52 (1873) (argument of
plaintiffs' counsel).
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"indefinite enlargement" of resulting federal power. 159
Subsequent writers have considered it ironic that a states'
rights advocate argued, in this manner, for an expansive
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, while devoted
unionists took the side of the state of Louisiana. 160 The
alignment of the lawyers makes perfect sense, however,
considering the objectives of the Slaughter-Houseplaintiffs and
the reason these pro-slavery "nullifiers" saw the Privileges or
Immunities Clause as a tool for protecting individual property
rights. Support for states' rights has often been little more
than a shallow disguise for other underlying values. John C.
Calhoun's passion for state authority accompanied a belief in
the right of individuals to own slaves; 16 1 he would undoubtedly
have opposed state interference with his "rights" to human
property, just as he opposed any assertion of federal authority
over such interests. In other words, John Campbell's leopard
had not changed its spots; whether he argued for states' rights
or for an expanded version of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, he advocated private property rights and laissez faire
economics. 162 In both contexts, he sought nullification of
government regulations that he perceived as interfering with
those rights.
This relationship between states' rights, property rights,
and slavery would have been fresh in the minds of those who
had been recently embroiled in the Civil War. Lawyers for the
slaughter-house monopoly understood, arguing before the
Supreme Court of Louisiana that efforts to overturn Louisiana
law echoed the "dangerous doctrine" by which "people were
urged to nullify the tariff laws of Congress, because it was
pretended that those laws tended to create a monopoly."1 63
Justice Miller must have been aware of the powerful emotions
159. Id. at 52-53.
160. See, e.g., Scarborough, supra note 154, at 216 n.21 (noting the irony,
and also questioning the motives of ex-Justice Campbell).
161. Calhoun and Campbell corresponded with each other regarding
arguments that could be made in defense of slavery. See Hans W. Baade,
"OriginalIntent" in Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69 TEX. L.

REV. 1001, 1045 (1991).
162. Compare Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 353, 493-518 (1857)
(Campbell, J., concurring) (arguing against federal interference with property
rights), with Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 44-57 (argument of plaintiffs
counsel) (arguing against state inference).
163. See Franklin, supra note 150, at 87 (citing RANDELL HUNT, SELECTED
ARGUMENTS, LECTURES AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF RANDELL HUNT 91-

92 (1876)).
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attached to the same word when he characterized plaintiffs'
argument as an effort to give the court "authority to nullify
such [legislation] as it did not approve as consistent with those
rights, as they existed at the time of the adoption of this
64
amendment."1
In opposing the plaintiffs' argument for constitutional
recognition of a right to free enterprise, Justice Miller ruled
that the Privileges or Immunities Clause had not expanded
federal authority to control substantive rights derived from the
common law. 165 Responsibility for determining the content of
state privileges and immunities remained with the states, and
Article IV, Section 2 continued to be a comity clause rather
than a source for the protection of inherent rights. 166 By
reaching this decision, Miller closed the door to a literally
67
defensible but wildly expansive vision of individual rights.
At the same time, however, Miller opened the door to federal
enforcement of rights based upon the Constitution or laws of
68
the United States.
Recent analysis reveals that Justice Miller's opinion for the
Court is more consistent with incorporation of the Bill of Rights
than with the anti-incorporation assumptions that generated
such heat among twentieth-century scholars. 169 As explained
by Laurence Tribe,
[i]t was only a series of later decisions that oddly attributed to Justice
Miller's majority opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases the expulsion
of the Bill of Rights from the privileges or immunities cathedral, an
expulsion nowhere to be found on the face of the Miller17 opinion and
indeed inconsistent with much of its language and logic. 1

164.
165.

Slaughter-House,83 U.S. at 78 (emphasis added).
Id. at 77-78

166.

Id.

167.

See McGovney, supra note 66, at 225-26 (noting that "a literal

interpretation of the clause.., would have resulted in... extreme
centralization, leaving to State governments little more than administrative
functions").
168. Slaughter-House,83 U.S. at 79-80.
169. See Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting Incorporation Straight: A
Reinterpretationof the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643, 683 (2000);
Robert C. Palmer, The Parameters of Constitutional Reconstruction:
Slaughter-House, Cruikshank, and the FourteenthAmendment, 1984 U. ILL.
L. REV. 739, 750; Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise: Reassessing the
Early Understandingin Court and Congress on Incorporationof the Bill of
Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1051, 1111-15 (2000)

(finding, in all three articles, initial Supreme Court support for incorporating
the Bill of Rights).
170.

Tribe, supra note 15, at 183-84. To underscore Tribe's point, note that
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To resurrect an incorporationist view of Slaughter-House,
however, would require reconstruction of subsequent history.
Rather than advocating such reconstruction, this Article
prefers to focus on the argument that Miller made-and that
even his harshest critics have never substantially questioned.
2. Sources of Federal Privileges or Immunities
To define the scope of federal privileges or immunities,
Justice Miller identified four sources of such rights. The first
and most obvious source is the package of negative constraints
found in the text of the Constitution. Miller's references
include "the prohibition against ex post facto laws, bills of
7
attainder, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts."' '
His list could also have included the power to enforce the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV as another
example of such constraints, but with the clear distinction that
by doing so he only implied authority to enforce the principle of
comity. 172
Justice Miller derived a second category of rights from the
"national character" of the federal government, such as a
citizen's "implied guaranteeU . . . , 'to come to the seat of
government to assert any claim he may have upon that
government."' 7 3 Based upon his prior opinion for the Court in
Crandall v. Nevada,174 Miller readily identified the right to
travel, free from state border taxes, as an example of such
rights.

when William Guthrie addressed this issue in 1898, the argument for
incorporating the first eight amendments into the Privileges or Immunities
Clause had "either not [been] made or was inadequately presented" in all prior
Supreme Court cases. WILLIAM D. GUTHRIE, LECTURES ON THE FOURTEENTH
ARTICLE OF AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 63
(1898). For a discussion of the series of Supreme Court opinions leading to
rejection of incorporation, see Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Road to Twining:
Reassessing the Disincorporationof the Bill of Rights, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1457
(2000).
171. Slaughter-House,83 U.S. at 77.
172. In a prior paragraph, Miller explained that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV only assured rights of comity; it "did not
create those rights." Id.
173. Id. at 79 (quoting Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 36 (1867)).
174. 73 U.S. 35, 49 (1867) (barring states from imposing entrance fees).
The contemporary Supreme Court recognized and reaffirmed this
constitutional right and the Fourteenth Amendment text in which it is
enshrined with its recent decision in Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). For
discussion of Saenz, see infra text accompanying notes 228-44.
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Justice Miller's third illustration of federal privileges or
immunities incorporated the "right to peaceably assemble and
petition for redress of grievances." 175 After reviewing the
historical record, one can easily imagine that Justice Miller had
in mind the events that had taken place in South Carolina and,
in particular, the plight of Judge Hoar, who had been driven
from the state while advocating the privileges and immunities
of African-Americans. In a recent elaboration of this theme,
Kevin Newsom explained that Miller's reference to a right of
assembly can best be understood as representative of the more
Clause
general point that the Privileges or Immunities
76
incorporated provisions of the Bill of Rights. 1
The fourth and final category of illustrations given by
Justice Miller has generally eluded critical examination. Miller
referred to the "right to use the navigable waters of the United
States" and to "all rights secured to our citizens by treaties
with foreign nations." 77
In an otherwise enlightening
discussion of Slaughter-House, Newsom refers to these rights
as "obscure and practically irrelevant."'' 78 In reality, however,
Justice Miller's point was fundamental. What Newsom missed,
and virtually all other commentators have ignored, is the
simple truth that the right to use navigable waters referred to
the Commerce Clause, and to the broad powers of Congress
under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. In parallel
fashion, the treaty rights reflected the text of Article II, Section
2 and gave the President power to make treaties with the
79
Senate's advice and consent.1
With this language, and through these illustrations, Miller
Privileges or
had covered all of the important bases.
immunities could be based upon (1) text that specifically
limited the states, (2) implied rights, such as the right to travel,
175. Slaughter-House,83 U.S. at 79.
176. Newsom, supra note 169, at 680.
177. Slaughter-House,83 U.S. at 79.
178. Newsom, supra note 169, at 687.

179.

Note that the right to navigate and treaty rights had both been

implicated by South Carolina's seizure of black seamen who entered the port

of Charleston.

Justice Johnson, on circuit, had emphasized the "right to

navigate," and had declared the "utter incompatibility" of South Carolina's law

with congressional commerce clause authority and with the laws and treaties
of the United States. Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493, 495 (C.C.D.S.C.
1823) (No. 4366) (concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction to provide the
remedy sought by the British seamen who had been jailed in Charleston). For
a discussion of frustrations with the failure to protect victims of the South
Carolina law, see supra text accompanying notes 101-10.
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(3) rights found in the first eight amendments to the
Constitution, or (4) rights established through exercise of the
power of Congress to pass laws or the power of the executive to
make treaties. Contemporary critics may ask why Miller failed
to explain his point in this explicit language. A fair reading of
his text, however, could hardly have more clearly illuminated
his language. All of his illustrations were offered in support of
the more general proposition that federal privileges or
immunities were those that "owe their existence to the Federal
government, its National character, its Constitution, or its
laws."18 0 Lack of appreciation for Miller's explicit text, and the
precise parallel structure of his illustrations, says more about
defects in our constitutional canon than about Miller's
interpretive shortcomings.
Justice Field's dissenting opinion questioned this analysis,
arguing that such a limited scope added little to the preexisting Supremacy Clause and could not have been the
intended field of action of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause. 181 But in making that argument, Justice Field
minimized the historical background of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In particular, he ignored the central debate of the
1830s, when South Carolina sought to nullify federal statutes,
and he ignored the evidence from the 1840s, when the federal
182
government appeared incapable of protecting Judge Hoar.
He ignored repeated assurances from proponents of the
Fourteenth Amendment that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause merely reinforced existing law. 183 Field showed no
appreciation whatsoever for the potential federal rights
outlined by Justice Miller, preferring instead to align himself
with the property rights advocates who believed that the
84
Fourteenth Amendment enshrined a right to free enterprise.1

180. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 79.
181. Id. at 96 (Field, J., dissenting).
182. By contrast, Justice Miller's reference to the "right to peaceably
assemble and petition for redress of grievances" can be easily construed as a
reference to that event. See id. at 79.
183. See supra notes 112 and 118 and accompanying text.
184. As explained by Hugh Evander Willis, "consummation [of those
arguments] had to wait for Justice Field to come into ascendancy on the
Supreme Court and for his extension of the due process clause to matters of
substance." HUGH EVANDER WILLIS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 887-88 (1936).
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3. Justice Miller's Legacy
In an especially harsh criticism of Justice Miller, Richard
Aynes challenges the credibility of the Supreme Court Justice,
asking how a man who had traveled around the country with
John Bingham, expounding upon the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment, could have written an opinion for the
Court so inconsistent with the intent of those who framed that
Amendment. 85 My conclusions contradict those reached by
Dean Aynes. Both Miller and Bingham argued that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause did not create new substance,
but rather reinforced laws and principles already encompassed
by the Constitution. Both men articulated views consistent
with incorporating the Bill of Rights and applying them to the
states. And both men appeared to understand the importance
of reinforcing federal supremacy to assure that no states would
again rely upon claims of state sovereignty to evade
responsibilities imposed by federal law. Both opposed the
commitment to private property rights found both in the
plaintiffs' appeal to the Supreme Court and in underlying
states' rights ideology.
When treated with reasonable
deference, Justice Miller's opinion demonstrates integrity, and
his legacy warrants respect.
D. REINFORCING FEDERAL SUPREMACY: STATUTES, CASES, AND
COMMENTARY

Both before and after the Supreme Court ruled in
Slaughter-House that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
protected those rights that "owe their existence to the Federal
government, its National character, its Constitution, or its
laws,"18 6 Congress, commentators, and courts reinforced this
interpretation.
This record contradicts the myth that
"everyone" disagrees with the ruling in Slaughter-House.187
1. Contemporaneous Legislation
Members of Congress struggled over a period of years to
develop "enforcement statutes" that would fulfill the obligations
created by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments.
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 conferred
citizenship on former slaves and protected the rights of "such
185.

Aynes, supra note 2, at 662.

186.
187.

83 U.S. at 79.
But see Aynes, supra note 2, at 627-28.
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citizens" to "full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings... as is enjoyed by white citizens." 188 Congress
overrode President Johnson's veto of this Act after a debate
that hinged largely upon questions about congressional power.
Congressman Bingham, whose heartfelt support for the ideals
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 could never be doubted,
nevertheless opposed passage of the Act even in the face of
overwhelming support in the House of Representatives because
of his belief that Congress lacked the authority to take such
actions. 189
Bingham's central role in promulgating the
Fourteenth Amendment reflected his drive to eliminate all
doubts regarding congressional power. To underscore this new
commitment to federal power, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was
reenacted as section 18 of the Enforcement Act of 1870.190 The
text of that act prohibited conspiracies of two or more persons
which threatened a citizen's "enjoyment of any right or
privilege granted or secured to him by the Constitution or laws
1 91
of the United States."
In response to continuing civil rights abuses, 192 Congress
enacted the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 to reinforce provisions of
both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, imposing
liability on persons who "under color of any law... cause...
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution of the United States." 193 A separate section
of the same act prohibited conspiracies to deprive "any person
or any class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of
94
equal privileges or immunities under the laws."
Congressman Bingham's defense of the Ku Klux Klan Act
began by noting the competence of Congress to "provide by law
for the better enforcement of the Constitution and laws of the
United States," and then emphasized "the power of Congress to
provide by law for the enforcement of the powers vested by the
Constitution in the Government of the United States, both

188.
189.
190.
191.

Ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291 (1866).
Ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144.
Id. § 6, 15 Stat. at 141 (emphasis added).

192. For a historical account, see C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE
CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d ed. 1974), and WILLIAM GILLETTE, RETREAT FROM
RECONSTRUCTION, 1869-1879 (1979).

193.

Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.

194.

Id. § 2.
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against individuals and States." 195
The Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause meant, among other
things, that no state should be allowed to "deny to any such
person any right secured to him either by the laws and treaties
of the United States or of such State."196 Bingham then
explained how the text of the Fourteenth Amendment
Privileges or Immunities Clause evolved from initial language
that simply paralleled the text of Article IV, Section 2, to final
language protecting the "privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States." As Bingham explained, Article IV meant
that "the State could not refuse to extend to citizens of other
States the same general rights secured to its own." 197 The
language was changed in the Fourteenth Amendment to
protect "other and different privileges and immunities," in
particular those defined by the first eight amendments to the
Constitution "which were not limitations on the power of the
States before the fourteenth amendment made them
limitations."1 98
By distinguishing between rights of state
citizens and rights of national citizenship, Bingham was
making the same essential distinction Justice Miller adopted in
Slaughter-House. The key difference, of course, was that
Bingham made incorporation of the Bill of Rights an explicit
element of his rationale, while Miller only impliedly accepted
the doctrine of incorporation. 199
The first clause of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 was
modified in 1874 by the Committee on Revision of the Laws
that had been appointed to overhaul all federal laws, and in
particular to make "such alterations as may be necessary to
reconcile the contradictions, supply the omissions, and amend

195. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 81 (1871).
196. Id. at 83.
197. Id. at 84.
198.

Id.

It should be noted that in this speech, Bingham contradicted

reservations he had expressed at the time when the Fourteenth Amendment
was promulgated about whether there were doubts regarding congressional

power to enforce all of the negative constraints on state authority included in
the original text of the Constitution. Id. at 83.
199. Note that, while ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment was
pending, Bingham and Miller traveled to the west coast together, and Miller
frequently listened to Bingham's rationale for the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Aynes, supra note 2, at 662. Aynes believes that Miller's opinion in
Slaughter-House repudiated Bingham's understanding of the Privileges or

Immunities Clause. By contrast, I conclude that Miller and Bingham were on
the same page, especially with respect to the issue of federal supremacy.
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the imperfections of the original text."200 As reenacted, the Ku
Klux Klan Act provision that eventually became 42 U.S.C. §
1983 protected United States citizens from deprivation of "any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws" 201 of the federal government. Congress adopted two
separate jurisdictional provisions, 20 2 one giving district courts
jurisdiction to protect "any right, privilege, or immunity
secured by the Constitution of the United States, or of any right
secured by any law of the United States to persons within the
jurisdiction thereof,"20 3 and the other giving circuit courts
authority to protect "any right, privilege, or immunity, secured
by the Constitution of the United States, or of any right secured
by any law providing for equal rights of citizens of the United
States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
5
States."20 4 Much has been made of these textual variations. 20
The more basic point, however, is that the language which
became a permanent part of federal law in 1874 tracked Justice
Miller's language from the previous year. Both Congress and
the Supreme Court had ruled that, regardless of any other
questions about its scope, the Fourteenth Amendment
protected privileges or immunities that owed their existence to
6
the Constitution or laws of the federal government. 20
Jurisdictional statutes enacted subsequent to the Civil War
further demonstrate this congressional understanding of
"privileges or immunities" and the importance of enforcing
federal statutes. The Judiciary Act of 1867 extended Supreme
Court jurisdiction to cases decided by the highest courts of the
various states "where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is
claimed under the constitution, or any treaty or statute of...

200. Act of June 27, 1866, ch. 140, § 2, 14 Stat. 74, 75.
201. Rev. Stat. § 1979, 18 Stat. 348 (1874) (emphasis added).
202. Id. § 563(12), 18 Stat. at 95; id. § 629(16), 18 Stat. at 111.
203. Id. § 563(12), 18 Stat. at 95.
204. Id. § 629(16), 18 Stat. at 111.
205. See, e.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1980) (holding that state
deprivation of welfare benefits protected by the Social Security Act violated
the protection of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by federal law); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 60812 (1979) (concluding that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Social
Security Act enforcement action because the rights involved were not granted
in terms of equality).
206. Compare The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 79 (1873), with Rev.
Stat. § 1979, 18 Stat. 348 (1874) (currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2000)).
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the United States." 20 7 In 1875, Congress enacted a general
federal question statute to assure that any claim based upon
either the Constitution or a federal statute could be brought in
federal court. 20 8 Commentators note that this provision for
federal jurisdiction came about after the Civil War had
"reshaped the understanding of federalism and, in particular,
the federal courts' role in the enforcement of civil rights."20 9 An
anonymous critic in 1875 explained the federal question
jurisdiction statute "as the culmination of a movement which
to strengthen the
began with the removal legislation of 1864
210
Federal Government against the states."
2. Supreme Court Precedent
The Supreme Court has repeatedly reinforced the
consensus that Congress intended to protect rights based upon
federal law when it promulgated the Fourteenth Amendment.
Numerous litigants tried, in vain, to argue that the Privileges
or Immunities Clause protected inherent, fundamental rights
without reference to federal structure, constitution, or
legislation. For example, in United States v. Cruikshank,211 the
defendants had been charged with conspiring to prevent two
African-Americans from exercising their right of peaceable
assembly. 2 12 The case did not involve government interference
with individual rights, and therefore the authority to prosecute
could not be based upon direct application of the First
Amendment even if the Court had accepted an incorporation
doctrine. 2 13 The Court's ruling left broad scope for the federal
government to act, and implied that the defendants could have
been charged with violating federally protected privileges or
immunities if the indictment had specified that the victims
were assembling "for consultation in respect to public affairs

207.

Ch. 28, § 2, 14 Stat. 385, 386 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1257

(2000)).
208. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, Ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (2000)).
209. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 216 (5th ed. 2000).
210. FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE
SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 65 n.34 (1928).
211. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
212. Id. at 544-45.
213. See Newsom, supra note 169, at 714-20 (arguing that in Cruikshank
the Supreme Court was again not presented with a genuine argument for
incorporation of the Bill of Rights).
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and to petition for a redress of grievances."2 14 The Court
concluded, however, that on the record before it, the defendants
in Cruikshank had not violated a privilege or immunity
21 5
protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
In contrast, Jersey City violated the privileges or
immunities of United States citizens when it attempted to
prohibit an assemblage of labor organizers. In Hague v.
Committee for Industrial Organization,2 16 the Court's plurality
opinion noted that Jersey City had interfered with rights
secured by the National Labor2 7Relations Act-a source of
federal privileges or immunities. 1
Other cases conformed to Cruikshank and Hague.
Individuals who were not members of an organized militia had
no Fourteenth Amendment right to organize as a military unit;
in order to claim such a right they "must be able to point to the
provision of the Constitution or statutes of the United States by
which it is conferred." 2 18 Extending the Slaughter-House
framework, state employee discharge laws, 2 19 foreign
attachment rules, 220 and state inheritance laws 221 all survived
Privileges or Immunities Clause challenges because the
underlying rights in question could not be traced to the federal
government. The Supreme Court rejected repeated invitations
to recognize privileges or immunities of United States citizens
independent of congressional action or other national
sources.222
In contrast, Justice Miller, writing for a unanimous
Supreme Court, determined that interference with the
establishment of a homestead on federal land fell within the
purview of federal statutes protecting the "right[s] or

214.

Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552-53.

215.
216.

Id. at 556-57.
307 U.S. 496 (1939).

217. Id. at 514.

In a separate opinion, Justice Stone did not reject the

Court's reasoning, but he did not agree that the record of the case adequately

supported the conclusion that such rights arising from the privileges or
immunities of national citizenship were at issue. Id. at 522 (Stone, J.).
218.

Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 266-67 (1886).

219.

Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 539 (1922).

220.
221.

Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 112-13 (1921).
Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525, 538 (1919).

222. As explained by Professor McGovney, "If counsel had put themselves
the question, what provision or text of Federal law creates or grants this
alleged privilege or immunity the vapidity of the contentions would have been
immediately apparent...." McGovney, supra note 66, at 224-25.
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privilege[s] secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States."223 The Court relied on one of the same statutes in 1895
as authority to prosecute individuals who interfered with
citizen reports of internal revenue law violations. 224 The Court
explained that allowing Congress to protect the rights or
privileges of national citizenship through such laws was
necessary in order to assure "the independence and the
225
supremacy of the national government."
Subsequent Supreme Court opinions reaffirmed the
understanding that the Fourteenth Amendment buttressed
national supremacy. For example, in the Selective Draft Law
Cases,226 Chief Justice White explained for a unanimous court
"how completely [the Fourteenth Amendment] broadened the
national scope of the Government under the Constitution by
causing citizenship of the United States to be paramount and
22 7
dominant instead of being subordinate and derivative."
3. Saenz v. Roe
In 1999, the Supreme Court sparked renewed interest in
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, finding for the first time
in more than sixty years that the Clause provided a direct
source of constitutional authority to invalidate state laws. In
Saenz v. Roe, 228 the Supreme Court ruled that the privileges or
immunities of United States citizens include the "right to
travel," and in so doing the Court protected new state residents
from discriminatory treatment. The Saenz decision finds deep
229
roots in the jurisprudence of Justice Miller.
In the 1867 case of Crandall v. Nevada,230 decided at a
time when the Fourteenth Amendment had been promulgated
and rested in the hands of state legislators, Justice Miller
concluded for the Court that states could not impose a poll tax
on individuals traveling from one state to another. 23' Miller
rejected arguments that the case had to be resolved through
223. United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76, 79 (1884) (upholding the
conspiracy provision derived from the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871).
224.
225.
226.
227.

In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 537-38 (1895).
Id. at 537.
245 U.S. 366 (1918) (upholding the national military draft).
Id. at 389.

228. 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
229.
230.

Id. at 502-11.
73 U.S. 35 (1867).

231. Id. at 48-49.
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reliance on express provisions of the Constitution, holding that
"[w]e are all citizens of the United States, and as members of
the same community must have the right to pass and repass
through every part of it without interruption."232 Six years
later, in his Slaughter-Houseopinion, Miller quoted extensively
from Crandall, using language from that case as his first
example of a privilege or immunity that owed its existence "to
the Federal government, its National character, its
Constitution, or its laws." 233 From Miller's perspective, the
Fourteenth Amendment grounded the right to travel to which
he had earlier referred only by implication. In Saenz, the
Court acknowledged and reaffirmed this
current Supreme
234
framework.
Equally significant, Justice Stevens's opinion for the Saenz
Court identified those "privileges and immunities" to which
newly arrived state citizens are entitled. 235 The Court noted
that cases construing the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, Section 2 already protected the rights of interstate
travelers to "obtain employment, '236 "procure medical
services," 237 and "even to engage in commercial shrimp
fishing"238 on an equal footing with state residents. Upon
becoming a bona fide resident, additional rights apply. As the
Court explained, "[t]hat newly arrived citizens 'have two
political capacities, one state and one federal,' adds special
force to their claim that they have the same rights as others
who share their citizenship." 240 The Privileges or Immunities
Clause protects the right of new state residents who complete
their interstate travel to receive the welfare benefits accorded
2 41
by state statute.
4. Recognition of Statutory Rights
The fact that Saenz is the only Supreme Court case to
232. Id. at 49 (citing The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283, 492 (1849) (Taney,
C.J., dissenting)).
233.
234.
235.
236.

The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 79 (1873).
Saenz, 526 U.S. at 503.
Id. at 502.
Id. (citing Hicklin v. Orbect, 437 U.S. 518, 527-28 (1978)).

237. Id. (citing Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973)).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
838 (1995)

(citing Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 398-402 (1948)).
(citing Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948)).
at 504 (quoting U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779,
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).

241. Id. at 506-07.
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directly base its ruling on the Privileges or Immunities Clause
contributes to the widely accepted myth that the Clause is
unimportant and, therefore, need not be included in the
constitutional canon. Proponents of this argument, however,
suffer from a peculiar myopia; they appreciate only those rights
that originate with the Supreme Court and devalue those
rights derived from federal statutes. 242 A central premise of the
Slaughter-House framework is that the privileges or
immunities of United States citizens include those based upon
federal law. 243 As noted in the preceding discussion, the
Supreme Court has emphasized this element of the doctrine,
repeatedly stressing the importance of federal statutes in the
creation of privileges or immunities.
To illustrate the relationship between federal statutes and
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, one only has to look at the
ways in which the Supreme Court has construed federal
statutes designed to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. The
text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 imposes liability on those who, under
color of state law, deprive any citizen or other person "of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws" of the United States. 244 In keeping with SlaughterHouse and with the historical development of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, the Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled
that the scope of this statute follows from a natural reading of
the text. For example, in Maine v. Thiboutot,245 the Court
concluded that state deprivation of welfare benefits protected
by the Social Security Act violated § 1983.246 In a clear
reference to the historical context recounted above, the
majority found "no doubt that [section] 1 of the Civil Rights Act
[of 18711 was intended to provide a remedy, to be broadly
construed, against all forms of official violation of federally
protected rights."247 In other words, this law, enacted to
242. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Some Reflections on the Rehabilitationof
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the FourteenthAmendment, 12 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POLY 71, 73-79 (1989) (arguing that Slaughter-House should be
overruled while acknowledging that "it is hard, if not impossible, to privilege
the readings of courts against those of thoughtful legislators").
243. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 79 (1873).
244. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
245. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
246. Id. at 4-8.
247. Id. at 5 (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 700-01 (1978) (concluding that municipalities are persons under §
1983)); see also Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 446 (1991) (finding that rights
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enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, protected privileges or
immunities derived from federal statutes.
5. Academic Acknowledgment
Constitutional commentators have questioned both the
wisdom and the necessity of concluding that the enforcement of
federal supremacy is the Clause's primary role. Most, however,
at least recognize this role as one of many. Thomas M. Cooley
explained in 1880 that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
protected rights such as participation in foreign and interstate
commerce, benefits of postal laws, or navigation rights,
"because over all these subjects the jurisdiction of the United
States extends, and they are covered by its laws."248 Cooley
questioned the necessity of the provision, given the Supremacy
Clause, but noted that the clause provided express authority
for at least some principles that had previously been merely
implied, 249 and concluded that "[m]any abuses of power are
forbidden more than once in the federal Constitution, under
250
different forms of expression."
In his 1901 treatise, Judge Henry Brannon agreed with
Cooley that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was not
essential; it merely emphasized "pre-existing law, imbedding it
in the Constitution forever, not leaving it to mere implication
and court decision." 25 1 He resisted tying down the substantive
scope of the clause by noting that "[p]rivileges and immunities
of the federal citizen may arise from new legislation, so that
legislation be within the scope of national authority. This
shows the futility, the danger
of any infallible definition of
'privileges or immunities.' 252
In 1918, Professor D.O. McGovney wrote an article

implied by the dormant Commerce Clause gave rise to "rights, privileges, or
immunities" protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City
of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 105-08 (1989) (enforcing the National Labor

Relations Act and finding that the Act creates rights enforceable under §
1983).

248. THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 245 (1880).
249. Id. at 248 (citing, as an example, the right to visit the national
capital).
250. Id.
251. HENRY BRANNON, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES
GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 62 (1901).
252. Id. at 64.

I.,
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summarizing the privileges or immunities doctrine. 253 The
Association of American Law Schools formally recognized
McGovney's article twenty years later as one of a collection of
essays considered to have "permanent value. '254 McGovney
concurred with his predecessors that the text of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause, as authoritatively construed, simply
reinforces federal supremacy. To capture the essence of the
doctrine, he paraphrased the clause to read: "No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge any privilege or
immunity conferred by this Constitution, the statutes or treaties
of the United States upon any person who is a citizen of the
United States." 255
He subsequently explained that, to
understand the scope of the clause, counsel must ask "what
provision or text of Federal law creates or grants this alleged
256
privilege or immunity."
Recent writers underscore the relationship between the
Privileges or Immunities Clause and federal supremacy, even if
by doing so they do not appear to consider either the reasons
for, or the consequences of, that interpretation. For example,
Todd Zubler dismisses the Privileges or Immunities Clause as a
source of protection for the right to travel by explaining that
"[u]nder Slaughter-House,the Privileges or Immunities Clause
has no independent function, except as an alternative to using
the Supremacy Clause."257 In their effort to provide an
authoritative statement of constitutional doctrine on behalf of
the Congressional Research Service, Johnny H. Killian and
George A. Costello echoed this assessment, explaining that
Slaughter-House reduced privileges or immunities to "a
superfluous reiteration of a prohibition already operative
against the states."258 References like these reveal the lack of
contemporary connection to reasons why, following the Civil
War, establishing the paramount status of national citizenship
seemed so important.

253.

McGovney, supra note 66.

254. 1 ASS'N OF AM. LAW SCH., SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW v (1938).
255. McGovney, supra note 66, at 220.

256. Id. at 225.
257. Todd Zubler, The Right to Migrate and Welfare Reform: Time for
Shapiro v. Thompson to Take a Hike, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 893, 917 (1997).
258. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS
AND INTERPRETATION 1569 (Johnny H. Killian & George A. Costello eds.,
1996).
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E. ASSESSING THE SCOPE OF PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES
PROTECTION

Supreme Court cases, congressional actions, and
constitutional commentary all reinforce the conclusion that
federal statutes are a significant source of privileges or
immunities. They do not, however, necessarily determine
which laws belong within the scope of this protection.
Commentators have identified two possible limitations of this
scope: They ask first, whether the clause applies only to
legislation narrowly targeted to protect United States citizens,
and second, whether it should be limited by judicially conceived
standards of "fundamental" rights. 259 Justice Miller's opinion
in Slaughter-Houseprovides a point of departure for answering
both of these questions.
1.

Citizenship

Professor McGovney used Justice Miller's opinion to
explain why United States citizenship could not logically be
seen as a confining element of that federal legislation
260
authorized by the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
McGovney noted that non-citizens share in more than half of
Miller's illustrations. 26' The right to peaceably assemble, to
petition for redress of grievances, and the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus apply to all persons, and are not limited to
citizens. 262 Similarly, the right to travel from one state to
another, reiterated by the current Supreme Court in Saenz v.
Roe, will not lose its status as a privilege or immunity of United
States citizens if shared by resident aliens. The conclusion
reached by McGovney, and the only conclusion consistent with
judicial precedent, is that the privileges or immunities of a
United States citizen include rights "conferred upon him by
national law, whether it is conferred upon him because he is a
citizen, or because he is a human being.... [I]t is none the less
a privilege 'of citizens of the United States' that others have the
263
same privilege."
This interpretation of privileges or immunities also helps
to explain why the text of the Clause restricts its application to
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

See, e.g., McGovney, supra note 66, at 232-42.
Id. at 238-42.
Id. at 238.
Id. at 238 n.42.
Id. at 240-41.
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citizens, while the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
apply to all persons. The distinction follows directly from the
understanding that privileges or immunities are rooted in other
sources of positive law. Aliens do not necessarily enjoy all of
the same benefits of domestic legislation as citizens. If federal
statutes establish privileges or immunities, then it follows that
the benefits guaranteed by that positive law might be limited to
United States citizens. Reference to citizenship recognizes both
264
the responsibility and the discretion vested with Congress.
2. Fundamental Rights
In significant part, confusion surrounding the argument
that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects only
"fundamental" rights can be traced back to Justice
Washington's Corfield opinion. 265 Grounding his conclusion
that non-residents cannot claim an interest in the common
property of a state, Washington declared that Article IV,
Section 2 should be confined to "those privileges and
immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental." 266
Justice Thomas, in dissent, seized on this language to suggest
the need to identify an exclusive list that would not include
"every public benefit established by positive law." 267 The long
history of references to privileges and immunities in the
centuries preceding adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,
however, contradicts the view that the phrase only
encompassed a limited list of specific rights. The alternative
message, articulated by Justice Washington and consistent
with common usage at the time, 268 was that the list in Corfield
was only a beginning. Washington emphasized that "privileges
and immunities" included "the enjoyment of life and liberty,
with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind,
and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety."269 He
264. An illustration of the reasons for allowing this flexibility can be found
in the federal patent law enacted in 1870 in which Congress restricted the
"privilege" of patents to United States citizens or to a resident alien who
"made oath of his intention to become a citizen." Act of July 8, 1870, § 40, 16
Stat. 204 (1870); see also infra text accompanying notes 316-21.
265. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
266. Id. at 551.
267. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 527 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
268. For a more complete account of broad references to privileges and
immunities in years prior to the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, see
Rich, supra note 17, at 240-49.
269. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551-52.
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concluded his long and general list with a reference to "[t]hese,
and many others which might be mentioned."27 °
Another source of confusion for Justice Thomas may have
27
been the Supreme Court opinion in Twining v. New Jersey, '
which rejected arguments that the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination could be applied to the states by
virtue of either the Privileges or Immunities Clause or the Due
Process Clause. 272 The holding in that case has obviously been
overruled. 273 In dictum, the Court gave a grossly distorted
account of the holding in Slaughter-House: "Privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States ... are only such as
arise out of the nature and essential character of the National
Government, or are specifically granted or secured to all
274
citizens or persons by the Constitution of the United States."
To illustrate the error of this account, consider the Twining
Court's inclusion of the "right to enter the public lands" on the
short list of privileges or immunities. 275 There is, of course, no
such inherent right. Congress determines whether to make
federal lands open to the public, and the Homestead Act
transformed the right to enter public lands into a privilege or
immunity of United States citizens.
In reaching that
conclusion, Justice Miller explained that "[n]o such right exists
or can exist outside of an act of Congress." 276 In subsequent
cases and commentary, federal legislation became the key277to
unlocking protection of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Justice Miller grasped the breadth of such rights, noting in
Slaughter-House that the scope of privileges and immunities
defined in Corfield "embraces nearly every civil right for the
establishment and protection of which organized government is
instituted. 2 78 Justice Clifford made essentially the same point
270. Id. at 552.
271.
272.

211 U.S. 78 (1908).
Id.

273. See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (establishing state
defendant's rights to freedom from compulsory self-incrimination). For an
account of the way in which Supreme Court opinions misinterpreted
Slaughter-House and thereby rejected
Wildenthal, supra note 170.

arguments for incorporation, see

274. Twining, 211 U.S. at 97 (citation omitted).
275. Id. (citing United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76 (1884)).
276. Waddell, 112 U.S. at 79.
277. See McGovney, supra note 66, at 220 ("Amendment XIV.
with privileges and immunities created by national law.").
278. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 76 (1873).

..

has to do
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two years later when he explained that "[v]aluable rights and
privileges, almost without number, are granted and secured to
citizens by the Constitution and laws of Congress."279 Judicial
interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 reinforces this point. The
Supreme Court has rejected arguments that privileges or
immunities protected by that statute should be limited to a
short or exclusive list. 28° In reaching that conclusion, none of
the justices contended that the Fourteenth Amendment had a
more limited scope than the broad enforcement language
chosen by Congress.
Justice Thomas concluded his dissent in Saenz by
emphasizing the importance of avoiding "the specter that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause will become yet another
convenient tool for inventing new rights, limited solely by the
'predilections of those who happen at the time to be Members of
this Court.' 281 With this language, Justice Thomas identified a
legitimate concern, one entirely consistent with Justice Miller's
admonition that the Court must avoid becoming a "perpetual
censor" of all state legislation. 282 The Privileges or Immunities
Clause did not empower judges to pick and choose based upon
their own conceptions of "fundamental rights." The solution
arrived at by Justice Miller-who sought substance from the
constitution, structure, and laws of the federal governmentcontinues to be the best resolution of this dilemma consistent
with historical authenticity, democratic theory, and judicial
restraint.
3. The Test for Privileges or Immunities
Additional questions about the scope of statutory privileges
or immunities could lead to extensive debate, were it not for the
fact that the Court has already addressed this issue. After the
justices decided, in Maine v. Thiboutot,283 that Congress meant
to provide a broad remedy for violations of federal rights when
it enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871, they explained that

279. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 566 (1875) (Clifford, J.,
dissenting).
280. See, e.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) (stating that "the §
1983 remedy broadly encompasses violations of federal statutory as well as

constitutional law").
281.

Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 528 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting)

(quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977)).
282.
283.

Slaughter-House,83 U.S. at 78.
448 U.S. 1 (1980).
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invoking the law required convincing the courts that the
aggrieved party has a "right secured" by federal law. 284 The
justices refined and clarified that requirement in Golden State
Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 28 5 upholding rights
conferred by the National Labor Relations Act and identifying a
three-part test to determine the scope of liability under §
1983.286 To wit, rights, privileges, or immunities have been
established by federal statutes if: (1) the law establishes
binding obligations; 287 (2) the interest is not too "vague and
amorphous" for judicial enforcement; 28 8 and (3) the person
claiming the right was an intended beneficiary of the federal
289
law.
Supreme Court decisions construing § 1983 reveal the
authority of Congress to enforce privileges or immunities.
Whenever federal statutory rights have been enforced against
recalcitrant states, courts have implicitly accepted and applied
the Privileges or Immunities Clause. One may argue that, by
protecting such statutory rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does nothing
more than reinforce the Supremacy Clause. Understood in its
historical context, however, that role rests squarely within the
Fourteenth Amendment vision of Congressman Bingham and
Justice Miller.
II. RECONSIDERING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CANON
A review of the background of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause illustrates several basic points. Those who framed the
Fourteenth Amendment understood that they reinforced
federal supremacy, protected individual rights secured by
national legislation, and eliminated claims of state authority to
Both the Supreme Court and
nullify federal statutes. 290
Congress subsequently reiterated this understanding. 29 1 In the
pages that follow, this Article will explain why this element of
284. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981)
(finding congressional intent inconclusive to establish a personal cause of
action to enforce provisions of a federal financial aid program for treatment of
the developmentally disabled).
285. 493 U.S. 103 (1989).
286. Id. at 106.
287. Id.
288. See id. (citing Pennhurst,451 U.S. at 19).
289. See id. (citing Wright v. Roanoke Redev. and Hous. Auth., 479 U.S.
418, 431-32 (1987)).
290. See supra notes 109-26 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 168-83, 207-46 and accompanying text.
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constitutional law should now be taken seriously. Where Part I
described the "what," Part II explains the "why."
Giving due respect to the Privileges or Immunities Clause
leads to a robust and coherent understanding of the
Constitution. It establishes an approach to federalism in
accord with the sense of nationhood and democracy embraced
by the Civil War Amendments to the Constitution. It provides
a constitutional structure for recognizing positive as well as
negative legal rights. It also allocates appropriate institutional
responsibility to Congress and the courts, respectively, for
development and preservation of those rights. Finally, it does
all of this within the confines of existing constitutional
doctrine.
A. CLARIFYING STATE AND FEDERAL RELATIONSHIPS

1. Commitment to Nationhood
The Civil War Amendments changed the relationship
between state and federal citizenship, putting to rest
arguments about the supremacy of state sovereignty.
Contemporary analysis of federalism, however, often focuses
upon 1787 perspectives without taking seriously the
commitment to national citizenship that became a part of our
Constitution in 1868.292 Understanding the Privileges or
Immunities Clause will help to reverse the flow of
constitutional doctrine that currently propels us towards an
eighteenth-century conception of federalism.
The importance of the issue of federal power to those who
framed the Fourteenth Amendment merits elaboration. George
Fletcher has explained that the constitutional amendments
ratified following the Civil War embraced three fundamental
values: nationhood, equality, and democracy. 293 In Fletcher's
words, the "least appreciated" of these postbellum guiding
values is the "commitment to nationhood." 294 As he describes
it, a "more powerful central government was a critical part of
292. See, e.g., Trisha Olson, The Natural Law Foundation of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 48 ARK. L. REV. 347, 393
(1995) (noting that "[bly the 1840s, national citizenship was a topic in all
political camps, and its relevance extended beyond the slavery issue"). Olson
argues that principles of natural law were attached to the prevailing
conception of national citizenship. Id. at 392-93.
293. FLETCHER, supra note 33, at 57.
294. Id.
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the new constitutional order," with its concomitant authority to
raise income taxes, enact welfare legislation, and protect and
295
secure individual autonomy.
Few, if any, writers have disagreed with the proposition
that the Privileges or Immunities Clause reinforced federal
supremacy. Some have suggested that this supremacy function
could not have been the sole, or even primary, role intended by
framers of the Clause. 296 Such comments should be accorded
their due. I readily agree that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause was intended to do more than simply reinforce federal
supremacy. As previously noted, 297 I agree with those who
argue for incorporation, and that other inherent rights, such as
the right to travel, gained textual support from that clause. I
would also highlight, however, the fundamental importance of
federal supremacy to those who promulgated the Fourteenth
Amendment.
As explained on the floor of Congress, the Fourteenth
Amendment's clear establishment of federal supremacy did not
really change the structure of the Constitution as Bingham and
others believed it should have been understood. 298
In
particular, it did not expand the substantive scope of federal
power; Congress must still identify an independent source of
constitutional authority for its actions. Reinforcing federal
supremacy, however, meant that Congress had unquestioned
authority to enforce federal statutes in all states and to require
state compliance with those statutes.
295. Id. at 110. Unfortunately, Fletcher fell under the spell of the
traditional canon, blaming Slaughter-House for the Supreme Court's failure to
recognize values of nationhood, equality, and democracy. Id. at 119-31. For a
review of Fletcher's book and discussion of ways in which Miller's opinion
advanced those values, see William J. Rich, Nationhood, Equality and
Democracy: FindingRedemption in George P. Fletcher'sSecret Constitution, 46

How. L.J. (forthcoming 2002).
296. Justice Field may have been the first person to make this argument
with his dissenting opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases, noting that the

"supremacy of the Constitution and the laws of the United States always
controlled any State legislation." 83 U.S. 36, 96 (1873).
297. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.

298. Note that Congressman Bingham presumably believed that the states
should have always been constrained by the Bill of Rights, and promulgated
the Fourteenth Amendment in part to reverse the Supreme Court rejection of
that argument in Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 249 (1833). See CONG.

GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089-90 (1866). As a result, arguments that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not "change" the federal structure were not
inconsistent with a belief that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the
Bill of Rights.
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2. Recent Supreme Court Decisions
The consensus in both case law and commentaries that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause reinforced federal supremacy
seemed unremarkable prior to a recent series of Supreme Court
decisions. In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,299 the
Court, by a vote of five to four, ruled that the Indian Gaming
30 0
Regulatory Act could not be enforced directly against a state.
In reaching that conclusion, the Court resolved a festering
dispute regarding congressional authority to abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment when it acted pursuant to its Article I
powers. 30 ' This 1996 decision marked the first time that the
Court had ruled against Congress on this point.
The Court's failure to address possible arguments based
upon the Privileges or Immunities Clause when deciding
Seminole Tribe might be explained on several levels. Most
obviously, the petitioners did not argue for, and failed to even
discuss the possibility of, a statutory cause of action based upon
42 U.S.C. § 1983.302
One might excuse that failure by
acknowledging ambiguity surrounding whether the privileges
or immunities of United States citizens should protect the
gambling rights of an Indian tribe, in spite of the Supreme
Court's broad construction of § 1983. 303 In a more fundamental
sense, however, the failure to present privileges or immunities
arguments reflected the unfortunate view that had prevailed
for several generations-that such claims were unimportant.
For more than one hundred years, no one had seriously
questioned the supremacy of legitimate federal legislation, and
our ability to appreciate the need to reinforce supremacy had
all but disappeared.

299.

517 U.S. 44 (1996).

300. Id. at 47.
301.

In Seminole Tribe, the Court reversed course, overruling a disputed

plurality opinion in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1 (1989), in which
the Court upheld congressional power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment.
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72. In a strained reading of federal statutes, the
Court also reasoned that alternative remedial provisions in the federal law
precluded injunctive relief despite the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123 (1908). Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73-75.
302. For critical commentary regarding this issue, see Vicki C. Jackson,
Seminole Tribe, the Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential Eviscerationof Ex
Parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 495, 523-27 (1997).
303. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1980) (concluding that a §
1983 cause of action could be used to vindicate rights based upon all federal
law and not just civil rights law).
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While we may easily excuse the failings of the court and
the litigants to address the Privileges or Immunities Clause in
1996, that failure becomes more difficult to defend in
subsequent cases after lawyers had received both notice of the
issues and the time to consider them. 30 4 In Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings
Bank, 30 5 the Court was asked to block enforcement of the
Patent Remedy Act, 30 6 which had been recently amended to
30 7
explicitly authorize private actions against state agencies.
To support the argument that Congress could not directly rely
upon Article I as a basis for abrogating state immunity, the
30 8
Court mechanically applied its holding in Seminole Tribe.
Because the power of Congress to protect patent rights
predated the Eleventh Amendment, the Court held, those
rights were subject to the restrictions of that amendment and
30 9
could not be abrogated by Congress.
In Florida Prepaid,plaintiffs presented the Court with a
second reason why Congress could abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment, arguing that state violation of patent rights
constituted a violation of due process rights, and section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment had empowered Congress to
remedy such violations. 3 10
The Court majority, however,
rejected that argument, not because it lacked theoretical
support, but rather because, when Congress provided for
enforcement of the Patent Remedy Act against the states, it
lacked "evidence that unremedied patent infringement by
3 11
States had become a problem of national import."
The test used by the Court to determine the scope of
permissible remedies for due process violations had been
304.

In fairness to the lawyers who participated in Seminole Tribe, it

should be noted that all of the decisions in which the Court has blocked
congressional authority to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment arose prior to
the Seminole Tribe decision.
305. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
306. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
307. See 35 U.S.C. § 296(a) (2000) (providing that "[any State, any
instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or

instrumentality of a State acting in his official capacity, shall not be immune,
under the eleventh amendment of the Constitution of the United States or
under any other doctrine of sovereign immunity").

308. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627, 634-36 (1999).
309. Id. at 636.
310.

Id.

311. Id. at 641.
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introduced in 1997 in the case of City of Boerne v. Flores. 3 12 In
that case, the Court had asserted primary responsibility for
determining the scope of the Bill of Rights. 313 When the
justices applied that ruling to patent legislation, they found the
federal law "'so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or
preventive object that [they] cannot be understood as
responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional
behavior.' 31 4 Asserting its independent authority to construe
the Due Process Clause, the Court concluded that congressional
scope of the problem
action had been disproportionate to the
315
caused by state patent infringements.
The Court reached its decision in FloridaPrepaid in spite
of the fact that patent rights constitute quintessential federal
privileges or immunities when viewed in light of the historical
roots of that concept. In 1870, Congress overhauled its
intellectual property legislation. 3 16 The legislation generally
reserved patent rights to United States citizens, providing that
"an alien shall have the privilege herein granted, if he shall
have resided in the United States one year... and made oath
of his intention to become a citizen." 3 17 Courts in that era
referred to the "privilege" secured by
commonly and repeatedly
3 18
federal patents.
When Justice Miller distinguished state and federal
privileges or immunities in the Slaughter-House Cases,319 he
emphasized the need to show a basis in the Constitution or in
federal statutes to establish the latter.320 In Florida Prepaid,
litigants could have conceivably pointed to both sources, since
312. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
313. Id. at 524.
314. Fla. Prepaid,527 U.S. at 646 (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532).
315. Id. at 647.
316. See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (revising, consolidating,
and amending the statutes relating to patents and copyrights).
317. Id. § 40 (emphasis added). The same act also reserved trademark
rights to those domiciled in the United States or in a "foreign country which by
treaty or convention affords similar privileges to citizens of the United States."
Id. § 77 (emphasis added).
318. See, e.g., Russell v. Place, 94 U.S. 606, 607 (1876) (referring to the
"ordinary form of such actions for infringement of the privileges secured by a
patent"); Fuller v. Yenter, 94 U.S. 288, 289 (1876) (referring to "the exclusive
privilege secured to him by the letters-patent"), affd, 94 U.S. 299 (1876).
319. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 75-80 (1873).

320. See id. at 79 (suggesting that some privileges and immunities "owe
their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its
Constitution, or its laws").
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the Constitution explicitly empowers Congress to secure "to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries," 321 and the Patent Remedy Act
embodies that authority. 322 Furthermore, federal law precludes
states from independently recognizing or enforcing patent
rights in that federal courts provide an exclusive forum for
resolving intellectual property disputes. 323
Few rights
established by federal law could more clearly satisfy the
standards set forth by Justice Miller in the Slaughter-House
Cases. No principled distinction can be made between the
protection of intellectual property on one hand, and the federal
homestead rights the Supreme Court has recognized as
privileges or immunities of United States citizens on the
other.324 The Court, however, was never asked to make that
distinction, because litigants ignored any arguments based
upon the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
In Kimel v. FloridaBoard of Regents,325 the Supreme Court
ruled that Congress could not abrogate state Eleventh
Amendment immunity when it authorized a private cause of
action to enforce the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA).326 The pattern of the Court's decision paralleled the
analysis in Florida Prepaid. The distinguishing question in
this case was whether age discrimination could be considered a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause or, in other words,
whether the federal law could be premised on congressional
authority to remedy violations of that clause. 32 7 In her opinion
for the Court, Justice O'Connor noted that age discrimination
only triggered rational basis review of equal protection
claims, 328 and that state age classifications generally satisfied
that minimal standard. 329 O'Connor concluded that the ADEA
could not be enforced against a state agency through a private
cause of action for monetary damages, because the federal law

321. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
322. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (Supp. V 1994) (amended 2000).
323. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2000).
324. See United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76, 79 (1884) (recognizing that
through making a homestead in accordance with federal laws, a person

"acquired a patent or title in fee to the land").
325. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
326. Id. at 91.
327. See id. at 66-67.
328. Id. at 84 (citing Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)).
329. Id. at 84.
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failed the City of Boerne v. Flores33 ° test for "congruence and
331
proportionality."
One year later, the Court reinforced this conclusion in
332
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett.
After Patricia Garrett underwent a lumpectomy, radiation
treatment, and chemotherapy for treatment of her breast
cancer, she sought to resume work as a director of nursing at
the University of Alabama. 333 She then learned that, because
she needed to schedule time for her treatments, she would have
to give up her director's position. 334 When she sued for relief
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Garrett was
told that the Eleventh Amendment barred her claim for
monetary damages against a state agency. 335 As in Kimel, the
litigants and the Garret Court restricted their Fourteenth
Amendment analysis to whether congressional action could be
based upon application of equal protection doctrine. 336 The
majority ruled that, as in the case of age discrimination, mere
rational basis review governed cases of state discrimination
against individuals with disabilities, 337 and, in spite of an
extensive record of discrimination against persons with
disabilities, 338 the ADA failed the test for "congruence and
339
proportionality."
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Garrett explicitly
noted that the majority did not question Congress's Article I
authority to enact the ADA or to prescribe standards to which
330. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
331. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 82-83 (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520). Justice
O'Connor concluded her opinion by advising litigants to seek relief on the basis

of state age discrimination statutes which could be found "in almost every
State of the Union." Id. at 91-92 (citing statutes from forty-eight states). She

ignored the fact that at least two of the parties to the consolidated litigation
before the Court were from Alabama, a state not included in her list of states
with protective legislation. Id. at 69, 91. It seems remarkable that forty-eight
states viewed the problem of age discrimination so seriously as to warrant

protective legislation, but Congress was precluded from passing protective
legislation for individuals from those two states that failed to provide

protection.
332. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
333. Id. at 362.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 374.

336. Id. at 365.
337. Id. at 366-67 (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 441-42 (1985)).
338. Id. at 381-82 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
339. Id. at 372 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)).
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states must acquiesce. The majority explained that ADA
"standards can be enforced by the United States in actions for
money damages, as well as by private individuals in actions for
injunctive relief under Ex parte Young."340 Garrett could not
recover money damages because equal protection doctrine could
not be stretched to include the anti-discrimination provisions of
the ADA. 34 1 In the absence of a Fourteenth Amendment basis
for its action, Congress could not abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment by allowing individuals to sue states for monetary
342
relief.
In Alden v. Maine,343 the Supreme Court went one step
further to limit individual enforcement of federal law against
state agencies, finding, "consistent with the views of the
leading advocates of the Constitution's ratification, that
sovereign immunity derives not from the Eleventh Amendment
but from the structure of the original Constitution itself."344 As
a result, the Fair Labor Standards Act could not be enforced by
345
suits for monetary damages commenced in state courts.
Erwin Chemerinsky, a leading figure among scholars who have
criticized the Court's opinion in Alden, notes the ambiguous
silence of the framers on the issue of state sovereign
immunity. 346 He questions why the Supreme Court majority, in
light of that ambiguity, should place higher value on protecting
state treasuries than on providing a remedy for the victims of
347
unlawful state action.
To Professor Chemerinsky's question, I would add another:
Why should the analysis of this issue leap from the
undocumented beliefs held by some in 1787 to the present-day
conclusion that our constitutional structure inherently protects
state sovereign immunity? Assumptions about the application
of federal law to state sovereigns were directly questioned in
the years leading up to the Civil War, and explicitly answered
in the Fourteenth Amendment of 1868.348 At the time when
340. Id. at 374 n.9.
341. See id. at 374.
342. Id. at 363-64.
343. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
344. Id. at 728.
345. Id. at 759-60.
346. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Hypocrisy of Alden v. Maine: Judicial
Review, Sovereign Immunity and the Rehnquist Court, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1283, 1290 (2000).

347. Id. at 1298.
348.

See supra notes 86-124 and accompanying text.
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states were asked to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment,
everyone understood that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
established the supremacy of national citizenship. Subsequent
writers, citing the Supremacy Clause, asked why federal
supremacy needed reinforcement. The United States Supreme
Court appears to have finally answered the question that
others forgot to ask.
Within its recent decisions, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the rule that the Fourteenth Amendment overrides the
Eleventh Amendment, and that if congressional power has
been properly grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment, then
claims to state sovereign immunity collapse. Chief Justice
Rehnquist, who authored the majority opinion in Garrett,
stressed that "the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of
state sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by
the enforcement provisions of [section] 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 349 In other words, if congressional action could
have been based upon the Fourteenth Amendment, Patricia
Garrett would have been entitled to relief.
Throughout their opinions, however, the justices never
mentioned the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Nor did
advocates who sought to enforce the federal law identify their
clients' rights as privileges or immunities of United States
citizens. Their collective lapse can be understood by reference
to the constitutional canon. The current generation of lawyers
and judges has been trained to ignore the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. This ignorance does not reflect a lack of
clarity in the constitutional doctrine that privileges or
immunities encompass federal legislation, but rather confirms
an assumption
that privileges
or immunities
are
350
unimportant.
349. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364 (2001)
(quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976)).
350. Failure to present the Court with arguments that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause governed its decision is not unique to these recent cases. A
remarkably similar historical path recently was traveled by lawyers who

initially failed to recognize the importance of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause. Generations of lawyers had been trained to ignore that provision of
the Constitution. In 1919, the Court distinguished between "residence" and
"citizenship," holding that Article IV protection only applied to the latter. See
La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1919) (upholding a South

Carolina law imposing a two-year residency requirement on licensed
insurance brokers). Due to the doctrine that developed pursuant to this
holding, protections of Article IV virtually disappeared from the constitutional
canon.

States could easily express their laws

in terms

of residency
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Reviewing the history and text of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides a lesson about federalism that many
citizens seem to have forgotten.
Approximately 500,000
Americans died in the Civil War, 35 1 and the amendments to the
Constitution following that conflict should not be taken lightly.
Contemporary advocates for states' rights need to understand
that slavery was not simply a case of "bad facts," and that 1868
saw an important reassertion of federal supremacy. In a
speech commemorating the centennial of the Constitution,
Justice Miller emphasized the unmistakable lesson of the Civil
War that "those who believed the source of danger to be in the
strong powers of the Federal Government were in error, and
that those who believed that such powers were necessary to its
352
safe conduct and continued existence were in the right."
This lesson does not mean that courts must give a blank
check to Congress when asked to determine whether a federal
action falls within a legitimate realm of action. 353 The Supreme
Court requires that, if Congress intends to abrogate 354
state
immunity, it must pass the "simple but stringent test" of
requirements rather than state citizenship. The Supreme Court reversed this
course in 1975, see Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1975)
(striking down a New Hampshire commuters' tax), but because historical
success with the Privileges or Immunities Clause had been so limited, lawyers
challenging employment laws that discriminated against out-of-state residents
generally relied upon the Commerce Clause rather than Article IV. For
example, Boston lawyers learned in 1983 that the dormant Commerce Clause
did not protect employees who were discriminated against by a Boston hiring
preference for contractors who employed city residents. See White v. Mass.
Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 205-06 (1983). Just one year
later, however, the Supreme Court reached quite a different conclusion when
plaintiffs challenged a Camden ordinance comparable to that of Boston. See
United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Camden County v. Mayor of
Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 222-23 (1984). Unlike in White, the Court held that
the "market participant exception" did not apply to Article IV, id. at 220, and
concluded that "Camden's ordinance discriminates against a protected
privilege," id. at 222. These cases teach the lesson that attorneys should think
outside of the traditional canons to determine which arguments may be
important. See 2 ANTIEAU & RICH, supra note 17, at 242 (warning that
"[w]hile much remains for future development of this body of law, lawyers now
ignore these provisions at their peril").
351. Press Release, Dept. of Veterans Affairs, America's Wars (May 2001),
at http://www.va.gov/pressrel/amwars01.htm.
352. SAMUEL FREEMAN MILLER, LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 23-24 (1891).

353. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (ruling
that Congress failed to adequately identify a link between restricting gun
possession near schools and interstate commerce),
354. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000) (quoting Dellmuth
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"making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the
statute."355 When Congress meets that test, however, courts
should defer to congressional development of privileges or
immunities much as they would defer to all other legislative
development of the positive law.
Americans adopted the Fourteenth Amendment to
eliminate arguments that proponents of state sovereignty could
rely upon "states' rights" to diminish the privileges or
In this era of
immunities of United 356States citizens.
"cooperative federalism," expectations of federal government
protection no longer fit within the narrow categories imagined
by some Supreme Court justices. 357 As understood and
respected at least until 1996, we should rely primarily upon the
political process to establish our privileges and immunities and
to balance the respective interests of state and national
358
governments.
B. BALANCING NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE RIGHTS
A reversal of trends in the federalism doctrine could be the
most obvious outcome of recognizing the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, but it might not be the most profound.
Expanding the constitutional canon will also modify the way we
think about the nature of constitutional rights. Constitutional
scholars have promoted clashing theories in this regard.
"Liberal" theorists emphasize the fundamental importance of
negative constraints upon government, while "republican" or
"progressive" theorists counter that government has an
affirmative obligation to sustain a good and just society. 359 The
v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989)), cert. granted, 528 U.S. 1132 (2000), cert.

dismissed, 528 U.S. 1184 (2000).
355. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (citing
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984); Quern v.
Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342-45 (1979)).
356. See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, Towards a ConstitutionalArchitecture for
Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 668-73 (2001) (discussing a
regime in which state agencies are invited to implement federal law).
357. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (making the
anachronistic argument that education should be kept within the realm of
See generally Judith Resnik,
state rather than federal responsibility).
CategoricalFederalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE L.J.
619 (2001) (critiquing the Court's categorical approach to federalism).
358. Justice Kennedy acknowledged this point in his concurring opinion in
Lopez, noting "it is axiomatic that Congress does have substantial discretion
and control over the federal balance." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577.
359. See, e.g., Robin West, Rights, Capabilities, and the Good Society, 69
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privileges or immunities doctrine changes the contours of this
debate.
Traditional constitutional doctrine generally reserves the
language of "rights" for negative constraints on government
The First Amendment begins with the words,
action. 360
"Congress shall make no law." 361 Each element of the Bill of
Rights imposes limits on the government, and the "state action
doctrine" circumscribes the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 362 Invidious action by
one private individual against another does not trigger a claim
for constitutional protection. 363 For example, when a social
worker failed to remove a child from an abusive environment,
her inaction did not violate the child's constitutional rights,
because the Due Process Clause does not generally impose a
positive requirement upon government officials to take
protective action. 364 Such examples illustrate the rule that
prevailing constitutional doctrine builds upon negative rights
theory.
From an alternative perspective, however, the government
also owes positive obligations to members of society. A
progressive constitution guides us to understand what
government should do-not just what it should be barred from
doing. A "good society" ensures "for its citizens the minimum
material preconditions of a decent life."365 Recognizing the
Privileges or Immunities Clause enables us to locate this
conception of society within existing doctrine.
1. Traditional Views of Privileges or Immunities
In debates about the positive or negative nature of

FORDHAM L. REV. 1901, 1901-02 (2001).

360. See, e.g., Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983)
(commenting that "the Constitution is a charter of negative rather than
positive liberties").
361.
362.

U.S. CONST., amend. I.
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000) (holding that

the Fourteenth Amendment only prohibits state action); The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 18 (1883) (holding that legislation by Congress enforcing
the Fourteenth Amendment must be aimed at correcting state actions).
363. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11 (stating that "[i]ndividual

invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the [Fourteenth]
amendment").
364. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 20103 (1989).
365.

West, supra note 359, at 1901.
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constitutional rights, existing privileges or immunities doctrine
either has been neglected or scorned. Advocates of using the
Privileges or Immunities Clause to incorporate the Bill of
Rights usually cite the Clause as a preferable mechanism for
applying traditional negative constraints upon states. 366
Literature devoted to that issue generally ignores the
distinction between negative and positive rights or the
prospects for using that doctrine to promote a more progressive
interpretation of the Constitution.
Within the positive rights literature, the Privileges or
Immunities Clause has at times been treated with the benign
neglect consistent with an assumption that, because the clause
is not a part of the normal canon, it does not require
explanation and need not be considered. 367 An example of this
treatment can be found in Robin West's book about "progressive
constitutionalism," which she begins by quoting from the
Fourteenth Amendment: "No state shall.., deprive any
person." 368 West skips over the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, and leaves it out of an entire text devoted to
reconstructing the Fourteenth Amendment. 369 Professor West
goes to great lengths to argue that the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses should be interpreted to encompass
positive government obligations to guarantee liberty and
freedom. 370 In making this argument, she challenges the
prevailing constitutional canon that limits equal protection and
due process doctrine to their characteristic negative
applications. Unfortunately, however, she never questions the
part of the canon that presumes the unimportance of privileges
or immunities.
Some critics who embrace the positive rights agenda have
argued that the Privileges or Immunities Clause could have
been the source of such rights, but blame the Supreme Court366. Cf. Curtis, supra note 12, at 1149-50 (noting both the positive role a
more extensive use of the Privileges or Immunities Clause would have on full
incorporation of the Bill of Rights and the Clause's original understanding as
setting limits on state powers).
367. The reader will note that this phenomenon is sadly circular. That
circularity, however, is not inescapable; the conception of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause that this Article proposes provides a means of overcoming
this cycle.
368.

ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 1 (1994) (quoting U.S

CONST. amend. XIV, § 1).
369. Id.
370. Id. at 105-51.
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and in particular the Slaughter-House Cases decision-for
failing to acknowledge those rights and leading the nation
down the barren, negative rights path. 37 1 Ample history,
bestowed upon us by both debates and the legislative record,
supports the belief that a postbellum Congress envisioned a
federal government responsible for promoting a broadly
construed public welfare. 372 Unfortunately, we have generally
accepted the myth that the Supreme Court "dropped the ball"
by failing to independently construe the Privileges or
Immunities Clause as a repository of such rights, thereby
forcing us to accept an account of the Constitution that respects
only the negative constraints on government. That myth
continues to obscure the reality.
2. Recognizing Privileges as Rights Granted by Law
The Privileges or Immunities Clause should be considered
the repository of positive rights, but only in a limited sense.
Placement within that clause does not occur through
independent judicial discovery. Rights to protection, to work, to
subsistence, or to independence take on only the substance that
can be otherwise derived from the Constitution, structure, or
laws of the federal government. At least some of those who
participated in framing the Privileges or Immunities Clause
understood this distinction. For example, when the United
States Senate debated promulgation of the Fifteenth
Amendment, Senator Frelinghuysen, a New Jersey Republican
who had participated in drafting the Fourteenth Amendment,
371. See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House:
A Critique of a Negative Rights View of the Constitution,43 VAND. L. REV. 409,
410-13 (1990). This denigration of Justice Miller's opinion in the Slaughter-

House Cases is especially hard to take in the context of contemporary
arguments for a more "progressive" interpretation of the Constitution. Thus,
an element of the condemnation of the conservative, negative rights view of
the Constitution is that it places undue emphasis upon rights to private
property. See Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs and the Bill of
"Rights": A Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 453, 457 (1992)
(discussing the conservative nature of constitutional rights). In the Slaughter-

House Cases, however, Justice Miller rejected plaintiffs' argument for property
rights. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 76-78 (1873).
372. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 33, at 109-10 (describing the post-war
federal government commitment to raise taxes, to enact welfare legislation for

widows and orphans of the war, and to eliminate badges of slavery as broadly
understood).
See generally THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND
MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES
102-51 (1992) (discussing development of a national welfare system following
the Civil War).
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explained why the "right" to vote had not been protected by the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. He noted that the Fourteenth
Amendment "makes no provision for rights by that name; a
privilege is a different thing from a right. It is a right granted
373
by law."
Critics have characterized this conception of privileges or
immunities as "completely nugatory and useless."374 Before
accepting such views at face value, however, we need to
consider the content of the "rights granted by law" that
Congress developed in the century following Senator
Frelinghuysen's statement, and we need to compare those
rights to the progressive constitution advocated by critics of a
constitutional doctrine built solely upon negative constraints.
Robin West identifies several depictions of the "good
society" envisioned by proponents of positive rights. At a
minimum, government has an "instrumental" obligation to
ensure some basic level of material goods for its citizens. 375 A
second conception, which West describes as "welfarist," adds to
the instrumental analysis a state obligation to "do whatever it
of its
takes to provide that minimal level of well-being to each
376
Still
citizens" in order to protect basic human dignity.
another perspective obligates a "decent and liberal state in a
good society" to "ensure that citizens achieve and enjoy certain
fundamental human capabilities...including the capability to
live a safe, well-nourished, productive, educated, social, and
377
politically and culturally participatory life of normal length."
These alternative conceptions of positive rights all fall within a
familiar spectrum that has deep historical roots. Remember
the words used by Justice Washington when he identified the
privileges and immunities protected by Article IV, Section 2 of
the Constitution: "Protection by the government; the enjoyment
of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess
property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and
373. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 980 (1869).
374. CROSSKEY, supra note 7, at 1119.
375. See West, supra note 359, at 1901 (citing MICHAEL J. SANDEL,
DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY
329-38 (1996)).
376. Id. at 1902 (citing Frank I. Michelman, ConstitutionalWelfare Rights:
One View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962 (1973)).
377. Id. (citing MARTHA NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

75-83

(2000);

Aamartya

Sen,

Rights as Goals, in

EQUALITY

AND

DISCRIMINATION: ESSAYS IN FREEDOM AND JUSTICE 11, 16-19 (Stephen Guest

& Alan Milne eds., 1985)).
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safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the
government may justly prescribe for the general good of the
378
whole."
When Justice Miller spoke for the Supreme Court in the
Slaughter-House Cases, he deferred to Justice Washington's
basic definition of privileges and immunities, noting that it
"embraces nearly every civil right for the establishment and
protection of which organized government is instituted." 379 The
meaning of the terms "privileges" and "immunities" did not
change when they were repeated in the Fourteenth
Amendment. The challenge Miller faced was to distinguish
federal privileges or immunities-those rights dependent upon
38 0
"the Federal government for their existence or protection," from those protected by state governments. He answered that
challenge by directly referring to existing sources of federal
38 1
authority.
In other words, privileges or immunities of United States
citizens include rights protected by those federal laws Congress
enacts for the purpose of securing minimum welfare standards
and ensuring our opportunities to make the most of our lives.
We may quarrel over whether the United States government
meets these obligations, and we may not agree with the way in
which politicians and courts allocate relative federal and state
responsibility. We should be able to agree, however, that the
traditional concept of privileges and immunities encompasses
these positive statutory rights. Those who disparage judicial
interpretations of the Privileges or Immunities Clause as
having merely reinforced federal supremacy 382 fail to take
seriously the assault on federal values that preceded the Civil
War, and also fail to recognize similar assaults that are taking
place today.
Contemporary understanding of protected positive rights
should begin with those explicitly included in the text of Article
I, Section 8 of the Constitution. Where Justice Miller referred
378.
3230).
379.

Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No.
The Slaughter-House

Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 76 (1873).

For prior

discussion, see supra text accompanying note 278.
380.

Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 77.

381. Id. at 79-80.
382. See, e.g., David Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court:
Limitations on State Power 1865-1873, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 329, 348 (1983);

Zubler, supra note 257, at 917 (citing EDWARD CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 965 (1953)).
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to the right to use our navigable waters, he might just as well
have referred to rights derived from any of the other sources of
Article I authority. As previously explained, 38 3 Congress and
the courts consistently referred to patent rights as "privileges"
that were restricted by law to citizens or those seeking
citizenship. The Bankruptcy Act of 1867, produced by Congress
one year after the promulgation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
serves as another example. Bankruptcy had been historically
intertwined with "debt slavery," 38 4 and the 1867 Act expanded
access to voluntary bankruptcy, broadened exemptions, and
With that Act, Congress
liberalized discharge rules. 38 5
protected the right of citizens to a fresh start free from
In the absence of
oppressive obligations of state law.
congressional action, the federal right to declare bankruptcy
would disappear, and it could not be resurrected by direct
judicial action. To paraphrase Justice Miller, bankruptcy
rights depend upon the federal government for their existence.
As a result, Congress has authority under section 5 of the
Fourteenth
Amendment to abrogate state Eleventh
Amendment immunity from actions brought in bankruptcy
38 6
courts.
Employment rights have been consistently linked to our
understanding of "privileges or immunities." When the phrase
was used in the Articles of Confederation, it was tied to "the
privileges of trade or commerce." 38 7 In Corfield v. Coryell,
383. See supra text accompanying notes 316-21.
384. See Vern Countryman, A History of American Bankruptcy Law, 81
COM. L.J. 226, 228 (1976).

385. Id. at 229-30.
386. In a recent bankruptcy proceeding, South Carolina challenged the
jurisdiction of a federal court to resolve questions about the discharge of debts
owed to the state. See In re Wilson, 258 B.R. 303, 305 (S.D. Ga. 2001). The
Georgia bankruptcy court rejected that argument, explaining that bankruptcy

rights were protected by the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities
Clause, which "remains a vital source of individual freedom and protection."
Id. at 310. But cf Sacred Heart Hosp. v. Pennsylvania (In re Sacred Heart
Hosp.), 133 F.3d 237, 244-45 (3d Cir. 1998) (rejecting arguments that

bankruptcy rights were protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause).
The Third Circuit opinion characterized the Privileges or Immunities Clause
as "essentially moribund" since the Slaughter-House Cases, id. at 244,
parroting the contemporary constitutional canon without considering
countervailing evidence. See generally Hon. Randolph J. Haines, Getting to
Abrogation, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 447 (2001) (advocating recognition of

bankruptcy rights as "privileges or immunities" subject to congressional
abrogation).
387.

ART. OF CONFED., art. IV, cl. 1 (1781).
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Justice Washington referred to the right to pass through or
reside in any state "for purposes of trade, agriculture,
professional pursuits, or otherwise." 388 In a contemporary
interpretation of the Article IV Privileges and Immunities
Clause, the Supreme Court noted that "the pursuit of a
common calling is one of the most fundamental of those
privileges protected by the Clause." 389 Constitutional scholars
have also recognized a "generous, pluralistic conception of
valued 'work' as a positive right tied to the concept of "social
citizenship." 390 Deprived of their ability to enforce their federal
employment rights, Daniel Kimel, 391 Patricia Garrett, 392 and
John Alden 393 lost out on the privileges or immunities provided
by the federal government to citizens of the United States.
In cases involving Kimel and Garrett, the Court explained
its decisions by finding that federal relief could not be derived
from the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 394 The lawyers who presented the cases to the
Court, and the justices who responded to the cases as
presented, viewed the ADEA and the ADA solely from the
perspective of the negative rights that equal protection doctrine
has historically safeguarded. 39 5 Because of the traditional
preoccupation with negative rights, they did not recognize the
positive elements of both acts that belonged within the scope of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
In John Alden's case, the justices in the majority relied
upon their sense of the importance of state sovereignty to those
388. 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
389.

United Bldg. & Const. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S.

208, 219 (1984) (citing Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S.
371, 387 (1978)).
390. William E. Forbath, ConstitutionalWelfare Rights: A History, Critique

and Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1821, 1887-88 (2001).
391. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (denying rights to
recover monetary damages for violations of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act), cert. granted, 528 U.S. 1132 (2000), cert. dismissed, 528
U.S. 1184 (2000).
392. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (barring

recovery of monetary damages for violations of the Americans with Disabilities
Act).
393. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that principles of state
sovereignty protected state agencies from being sued by individuals for state
court enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act).
394. Garrett,531 U.S. at 365-68; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83-91.
395.

See 68 U.S.L.W. 3279-80 (Nov. 2, 1999) (summarizing Kimel's oral

arguments); 69 U.S.L.W. 3288 (Oct. 31, 2000) (describing the argument of
plaintiffs counsel in Garrett).
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who established the structure of the Constitution in 1787 to
support the conclusion that the Fair Labor Standards Act could
396
not be enforced against state agencies in state courts.
Neither the litigants nor the Justices considered the evolution
of that structural understanding that emerged as a product of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice Miller could not have anticipated the twentiethcentury welfare state or the broad scope of contemporary
federal employment law.
From a nineteenth-century
perspective, states had a broader role than Congress in
protecting "the enjoyment of life and liberty" or the right "to
pursue and obtain happiness and safety."397
Miller,
nevertheless, would have understood that rights based upon
the Spending or Commerce Clauses of Article I, Section 8 were
privileges or immunities of United States citizens. 398
Unfortunately, modern lawyers and academics have left the
Privileges or Immunities Clause out of the constitutional
canon, and thereby have failed to recognize how the framework
Justice Miller established protects our contemporary
conception of workers' rights.
Some will object to use of the term "rights" in reference to
statutory claims. They are not rights in the strong sense
articulated by Ronald Dworkin, because they can be changed,
or even eliminated, by simple legislative action. 399 Dworkin's
views on this issue, however, are a part of the problem, guiding
our serious attention to rights controlled by the judiciary and
diminishing the importance of legislatively-derived rights.
Statutory privileges or immunities can have the status of rights
in a significant legal sense: They represent claims for positive
support or protection potentially enforceable against federal,
state, and local government entities.
To repeat Senator
Frelinghuysen's distinction, "a privilege .... is a right granted
by law. ' 40 0 The general public comprehends that workers'
rights and social security rights belong in this category; those
charged with preserving the constitutional canon miss this

396. Alden, 527 U.S. at 714-30.
397. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No.
3230).
398.
399.

See supra notes 177-179 and accompanying text.
See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 191 (1977) (noting

that our fundamental constitutional rights "represent rights against the
Government in the strong sense").
400.

See supra note 373.
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point when they take Professor Dworkin too seriously.
3. Preserving Negative Constraints
We need not give up on our theory of negative rights to
accept a theory of positive rights based upon the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. As Frank Michelman recently noted, there
is little point in fantasizing about a constitutional doctrine
completely outside of the courts: "However receptive
mainstream American constitutional thought may be to the
idea of a constitution extending beyond the courts, it is not,
today, about to imagine the constitution taken away from the
courts." 4 1 As explained in more detail in the section that
follows, the theory of positive rights I propose does not directly
affect the Supreme Court's role as superintendent of the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses. It would, however,
significantly redress the imbalance in traditional perceptions of
constitutional rights.
Preservation of existing negative rights doctrine may not
satisfy those writers who perceive a fundamental conflict
between negative and positive rights. 402 There is, however, a
constructive purpose to be served in recognizing both positive
and negative rights within the Fourteenth Amendment text.
This recognition elevates the discussion of statutory rights and
facilitates their comparison with the negative rights that
traditionally draw our exclusive attention. Negative and
positive rights are cousins, residing in the same house, and not
mere distant relatives. This recognition also prevents courts
from undermining positive rights based upon theories-such as
state sovereignty-that lack the stature of countervailing
constitutional rights. I am not advocating the transformation
of constitutional law to reverse the emphasis we place on
positive and negative rights. I do, however, advocate restoring
balance to that relationship within the contours of existing
doctrine.

401. Frank I. Michelman, Democracy-Based Resistance to a Constitutional
Right of Social Citizenship: A Comment on Forbath, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
1893, 1897 (2001).
402. See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, Rights, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393,
404 (1988) (discussing the "undesirable long-term risks of [individual] rights
conceptions" and the need to "ground rights theory in a substantive conception
of the good society"); West, supra note 359, at 1904 (noting that "liberal rights,
for better or for worse, but virtually by definition, are all obstacles to, rather
than a possible vehicle for, any welfarist effort").
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C. ALLOCATING JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSIBILITY
Our collective failure to understand or appreciate Justice
Miller's language in the Slaughter-House Cases reflects a more
general preoccupation with the issue of judicially enforced,
inherent rights. Recognition of a theory of positive rights also
entails admitting the fact that lawyers and judges do not
occupy the center of the legal universe. This observation
requires a willingness to adjust our traditional approaches to
legislative and judicial responsibilities.
Ever since Alexis de Tocqueville traveled across the United
States, we have acknowledged the premise that most political
questions eventually become judicial questions. 4 3 In the
context of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, however, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that the claims in
question must be traced to a source in the federal constitution,
Accepting this framework means
structure, or law. 40 4
admitting that Congress, rather than the courts, plays the
For
dominant role in defining privileges or immunities.
generations, Justice Miller has been excoriated for failing to
independently conjure a right to free enterprise. But most
recent theorists who emphasize the importance of positive
rights should easily understand why Miller rejected the role
advocated by the Louisiana butchers who were being forced to
relocate their businesses.
1. Legislative Responsibility and Judicial Deference
In her advocacy of progressive constitutionalism, Robin
West underscores the need for legislative responsibility: "[T]he
relevance of the progressive interpretation of the Constitution
depend[s] not only on the merits of its interpretive claims but
also, and perhaps more fundamentally, on a federal Congress
Michael
reenlivened to its constitutional obligations."40 5
Gerhardt blames the Supreme Court's decision in SlaughterHouse for leading us down a track of exclusively negative
constitutional rights, but then emphasizes that section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment empowered Congress to establish a
"positive, comprehensive federal program" defining and

403.

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 248 (J. P. Mayer &

Max Lerner eds. & George Lawrence trans., 1966).
404.

See supra text accompanying notes 218-25.

405.

WEST, supra note 368, at 219.
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protecting fundamental civil rights. 40 6 Lawrence Sager also
favors a theory of affirmative social rights, and recognizes that
such rights would "elude judicial enforcement." 40 7 In his words,
"affirmative rights come wrapped with questions of judgment,
strategy, and responsibility that seem well beyond the reach of
courts in a democracy."40 8 The judicial role should remain
secondary. 40 9 Courts should not be encouraged to take over
such rights, because by doing so they would intrude upon the
responsibilities of democratic government. 410 As explained by
Frank Michelman, judicial enforcement of broadly defined
constitutional rights could "sweepingly preempt major public
policy choices from the ordinary politics of democratic debate
and decision."4 11
The judicial framework constructed to limit the scope of
the Equal Protection Clause embodies some of the concerns of
these writers. Good reasons exist for not giving "strict judicial
scrutiny" to age and disability classifications. Elderly citizens
and those with disabilities deserve freedom from unfair or
invidious discrimination, but lines to be drawn in these
contexts entail an unavoidable exercise of discretion.
Furthermore, both age and disability cut across social and
economic spectra in ways that reinforce political protection. As
a result, we expect the legislative and executive branches of
government to delineate these issues free from the intense
judicial constraints implied by strict scrutiny standards.
In light of these concerns, the Supreme Court had to make
a choice. In Kimel and Garrett,the justices could have allowed
Congress to enforce the Equal Protection Clause without regard
to the contours of Supreme Court doctrine. They could have
ruled that, although states do not violate judicial standards of
406.

Gerhardt, supra note 371, at 443 (quoting ROBERT K. CARR, FEDERAL

PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: QUEST FOR A SWORD 36 (1947) (emphasis

added)).
407. Lawrence G. Sager, Thin Constitutions and the Good Society, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 1989, 1990 (2001).
408. Id.; see also Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections
on the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 410, 435 (1993)

(discussing the "gap between constitutional case law and political justice").
409. Sager emphasizes the judicial role in protecting procedural rights, as
in Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), and preventing categorical
exclusions from minimal educational entitlements, as in Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202 (1982). Sager, supra note 408, at 429-33.
410. Sager, supra note 407, at 425 (noting that the imposition of welfare

programs by the judiciary could cause those programs to atrophy).
411.

Michelman, supra note 401, at 1895.
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protection for the elderly or disabled unless they act
irrationally, an entirely different set of standards applies when
Congress weighs these issues. Taking that course, however,
would have expanded the scope of federal power and also
introduced a level of incoherence into equal protection doctrine.
A majority of justices were not prepared to accept such results.
Those justices concluded that the divide between rational basis
and strict scrutiny standards used by the courts to determine
whether states violated the Equal Protection Clause should
also be used as the guide to determine the scope of
congressional remedial authority derived from that clause.
In rejecting a broad approach to congressional power to
enforce the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court made
two fundamental points. First, laws to protect the interests of
elderly or disabled citizens should be generated by the
legislature. As Chief Justice Rehnquist explained, "[i]f special
accommodations for the disabled are to be required, they have
to come from positive law and not through the Equal Protection
Clause."4 12
Significantly, the Court never questioned
congressional Commerce Clause authority to enact such laws;
Chief Justice Rehnquist affirmed their validity even in the
context of enforcement against the states through either suits
4 13
for injunctive relief or direct federal government action.
Patricia Garrett lost her claim, however, because the Chief
Justice failed to recognize any authority by which federal
positive law could supercede the Eleventh Amendment.
Critics of the Court's opinions in Kimel and Garrett focus
almost exclusively on the second step in the Court's analysisthat negative constraints on constitutional power will be
controlled by the judiciary.
The Court addressed this
distinction in City of Boerne v. Flores.4 14 In Boerne, the Court
ruled that Congress could not override perceived limitations in
Supreme Court protection for the free exercise of religion. The
Court explained its conclusion by noting that separation of
powers gives the Supreme Court primary responsibility for
interpreting the "self-executing prohibitions on government
action."4 15 Equal protection principles bind Congress as well as
the states, and the majority in Garrett opposed giving Congress

412. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001).
413. Id. at 374 n.9.
414.

521 U.S. 507, 523-24 (1997).

415. Id.
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the authority to define the scope of those principles 41 6 even
when, as in Boerne, Congress sought to be more generous than
the Court in the protection that it offered.
Relying upon the distinctions between negative and
positive rights, the Supreme Court can defend its test for
congruence and proportionality in the context of due process
and equal protection standards. But this rationale for elevated
Supreme Court scrutiny disappears in the context of privileges
or immunities.
The Privileges or Immunities Clause
encompasses a different set of separation of powers concerns
from those discussed by the Court in Boerne. The positive
rights embodied by that clause are derived, in significant part,
from Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. Contours of
congressional authority under Article I have long been
governed, first and foremost, by the political process and only
4 17
marginally through judicial enforcement.
Fourteenth Amendment doctrine is built around the
division between Supreme Court authority to recognize and
supervise enforcement of the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, on one hand, and
legislative authority to determine the scope of positive law that
does not conflict with the principles embodied by those clauses,
on the other. This distinction has been the primary source of
confusion and complaint by those who have challenged the
Supreme Court's decisions or have tried, in vain, to steer a
different course. In the Slaughter-House Cases, the dissenting
justices wanted the Court to recognize an inherent right to
engage in trade free from the health and safety regulations
imposed by the state. 4 18 Justice Miller blocked that approach,
holding that federally protected privileges or immunities must
41 9
be based upon an existing source of national law.
Early civil rights legislation also recognized this issue. For
several years, Congress debated whether to protect AfricanAmericans from private discriminatory acts, and eventually
enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1875.420 But the Supreme Court
416. Garrett,531 U.S. at 374.
417. See JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL
POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE

SUPREME COURT 171-259 (1980) (explaining that Article I limits on national
power should only be enforced through the political process).
418.

See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.

419.

See supra notes 171-83 and accompanying text.

420.

Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
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ruled in the Civil Rights Cases42 1 that the Fourteenth
Amendment had not empowered Congress to address racial
discrimination in the absence of state action. 422 In a prescient
passage, however, Justice Bradley observed in his opinion for
the Court that different conclusions could follow if Congress
had the authority to address such issues directly-for example,
through the exercise of its power to regulate commerce. 4 23 The
full panoply of modern civil rights legislation meets this test.
The Privileges or Immunities Clause assured that states could
not avoid compliance with federal statutory rights derived from
existing sources of congressional power.
The Thirteenth Amendment stands as a solitary exception
to the traditional theory that the United States Constitution
established only negative rights. Experience with that
Amendment further illustrates the line between congressional
responsibility for development of the positive law and Supreme
Court supervision of constraints on government. Individuals
have a constitutional right to freedom from slavery regardless
of whether there has been government complicity in activity
that amounted to involuntary servitude. 424 While plaintiffs
have argued that the Thirteenth Amendment broadly protects
individual rights, 425 courts have generally avoided the
responsibility of developing such rights. In keeping with the
rule that Congress has general authority over development of

421. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
422. Id. at 13.
423. See id. at 19 (noting that the issue of Commerce Clause regulation
was not before the Court). Even when the contemporary Supreme Court ruled
that Congress lacked Commerce Clause authority to impose criminal sanctions
on gun possession near schools, Justices in the center of the Court assured
that they did not challenge the breadth of congressional power to enact civil
rights legislation. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 573-74 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964) and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), and
noting that such cases "are not called in question by our decision today").
424. This distinction was noted in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883),
where the Court found that the Thirteenth Amendment did not include a state
action requirement, but concluded that acts of racial discrimination in public
accommodations did not fall within the scope of the ban on slavery. Id. at 20.
425. See, e.g., Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1577-78 (5th
Cir. 1984) (Wisdom, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing
that issues of employment discrimination and affirmative action should be
addressed in terms of the Thirteenth Amendment); Douglas L. Colbert,
Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1995)
(providing an overview of arguments for expansive application of the
Thirteenth Amendment).
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positive rights, the Court's approach to the Thirteenth
Amendment differs from its recent insistence upon judicial
control over the content of due process or equal protection
guarantees. 426 When asked whether psychological coercion to
work constituted involuntary servitude, the Court denied relief,
leaving the door open for Congress to broaden the protection.
As Justice O'Connor explained: "Whether other conditions are
so intolerable that they, too, should be deemed to be
involuntary is a value judgment that we think is best left for
Congress." 427 In different words, positive rights, like freedom
from involuntary servitude, require an exercise of legislative
judgment.
428
Finally, the recent Supreme Court ruling in Saenz v. Roe
also conforms to the pattern I have described. The Court relied
in part upon Slaughter-House and concluded that a "right to
travel" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment included "the
right of the newly arrived citizen to the same privileges and
immunities enjoyed by other citizens of the same State."429 The
judicial role in Saenz, however, remained secondary; the
legislative branch continues to be responsible for determining
the existence and scope of the underlying rights in question. In
Saenz, the majority recognized statutory rights to welfare
assistance as "privileges and immunities" that could not be
denied to the newly arrived citizen. 430 Consistent application of
that holding reinforces the conclusion that federal legislation,
and, in particular, the Social Security Act, establishes
privileges or immunities of United States citizens.

426. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 170 (1976) (holding that
the Thirteenth Amendment authorized Congress to assure all United States
citizens "the same right to make and enforce contracts as is enjoyed by white
citizens" (quoting Civil Rights Act, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1983)); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968) (ruling
that "Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to
determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority
to translate that determination into effective legislation").
427. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 951 (1988).
428. 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
429. Id. at 502.
430. Id. Note the statement by the Court in Saenz that "Congress has no
affirmative power to authorize the States to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment," id. at 508, should not be confused with the understanding that
Congress can change and even eliminate the positive law that constitutes a
"privilege" of United States citizens. Thus, Congress cannot alter the right to
travel guaranteed by the structure of the Constitution, but Congress can
decide whether or not to establish welfare laws or employment rights.
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2. A Role for Conscientious Legislators and Judges
Taking seriously the congressional role in shaping the
privileges or immunities of United States citizens also means
rethinking traditional conceptions of the "conscientious
legislator's" role. When Paul Brest initially coined that
phrase, 43 1 he emphasized the responsibility of legislators to
432
assure that their motives conform to constitutional doctrine.
In the context of privileges or immunities, we move beyond
questions about legislative motive and adherence to judiciallycrafted doctrine, and instead emphasize the constitutional
responsibilities of legislators. Privileges or immunities doctrine
imposes an affirmative obligation on lawmakers to determine
what the legally enforceable rights of United States citizens
should be, and how those rights should be protected. When
they otherwise conform to the text of the Constitution, and
when they are enforceable against the government itself, the
rights in question take on great significance- A conscientious
433
legislator should be expected to take that role seriously.
The fact that the legislature has responsibility for shaping
privileges or immunities should also move us towards
recognizing a judicial counterpart to the role of the
conscientious legislator. A conscientious judge should be
responsible for recognizing and reinforcing congressional
judgments regarding the privileges or immunities of all
Americans.
The judge who undermines enforcement of
legitimate statutory rights-who fails to value the rightsdefining role assigned to Congress-runs the same risk of
violating the constitutional oath as does a legislator whose
motives conflict with those constitutional rights that the courts
have properly defined.

431.

See Paul Brest, The ConscientiousLegislator's Guide to Constitutional

Interpretation,27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975).

432. Id. at 589-92.
433. Frank Michelman expresses concern about debasing the "rhetorical
currency" by naming something a constitutional right that might not be taken

seriously by presumably conscientious public officials. Michelman, supra note
401, at 1898. When the responsibility to shape and enforce rights is fully
understood, however, I do not see any reason why it should not be taken
seriously. Contemporary political battles surrounding such issues as Social
Security, Medicare, or the minimum wage suggest that legislators probably
have a firmer grasp of their responsibility than lawyers who are waiting for
the Supreme Court to designate our rights.
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III. CONCLUSIONS: RESTORING INTEGRITY TO THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CANON
Those who describe the Privileges or Immunities Clause as
moribund because it does little more than reinforce federal
supremacy are half right. But which half? If, as everyone
seems to agree, the clause embodies the principle that federal
law is supreme, and that state sovereignty yields to this
principle, then the Clause should have a significant impact on
current constitutional doctrine. If, on the other hand, the
Clause does not protect federal statutory rights, then we might
as well offer a final benediction for the provision that our
ancestors worked so diligently to secure.
Restoring life to privileges and immunities supports what
Vicki Jackson recognizes as our obligation to develop a holistic
view of the Constitution, "an approach that seeks to take into
account the basic structure and values of the Constitution in
the interpretation of all of its provisions." 434 Jackson argues
that the Fourteenth Amendment "complement[ed] the original
Article I commitment to uniform and effective national laws on
subjects of importance to the Union with a commitment to
equal national citizenship." 4 35 While Jackson gives only
"tentative" support to the argument that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause empowered Congress to abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment, pending a review of the historical
record, 436 my conclusions following such a review confirm her
suspicions.
Although the members of Congress who debated the
Privileges or Immunities Clause in 1866 did not refer to
Eleventh Amendment immunity, 437 this should hardly be a
surprise; at that time it was not obvious that the Eleventh
438
Amendment even applied to enforcement of federal statutes.
434. Jackson, supra note 17, at 1281.
435. Id. at 1310.
436. Id. at 1306.
437. See John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create
Causes of Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh
and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1454, 1469 (1975)
(concluding that Eleventh Amendment history supports the principle that
"Congress should be free to determine the extent of federal court jurisdiction
over state governments, and this principle was reaffirmed by the ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment").
438. When Congress promulgated the Fourteenth Amendment, it was
logical to assume that the Eleventh Amendment did not apply to cases in
which citizens sued their own state to enforce federal rights. See Osborn v.
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Without mentioning the Eleventh Amendment, however, the
Fourteenth Amendment framers meant to assure that state
sovereignty could not be used as a shield to avoid compliance
with federal law. 439 Furthermore, contemporaneous federal
statutes and Supreme
Court opinions-sources entitled to
"great weight"4 4 0-confirmed
those intentions.
Leading
Cooley,
Henry
Brannon,
and
commentators, including Thomas
441
D.O. McGovney, all agreed.
Thus, in addition to providing a holistic interpretation of
the Constitution, concluding that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause establishes a basis for enforcing federal statutes against
states also satisfies traditional tests for integrity.442 The
Supreme Court directs us to "history, practice, precedent, and
the structure of the Constitution"443 for guidance to resolve
constitutional disputes. Following that directive, I am not
advocating a switch to the Privileges or Immunities Clause as a
source for incorporating the Bill of Rights, even though good
arguments can be made that the framework identified by
Justice Miller in Slaughter-House incorporated the first eight
amendments. 444 Many will view that issue as water over the
dam; changing the source of the incorporation doctrine is
unlikely given the precedent surrounding the Due Process
445
Clause.
Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738, 850-52 (1824) (allowing suit against
officers or agents of a state when the Eleventh Amendment prohibited naming
the state itself as a party); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 412 (1821)
(upholding Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction in an appeal by a state
citizen from state prosecution). The Supreme Court applied the Eleventh
Amendment to federal question jurisdiction in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1
(1890), holding for the first time that, regardless of textual limits, the
Amendment barred citizens from suing their own state in federal court. Id. at
15.
439. See supra text accompanying notes 356-61.
440. See Cohens, 19 U.S. at 418.
441. See supra text accompanying notes 248-59. In 1997, the Supreme
Court majority relied upon both Cooley and Brannon to support their
interpretation of section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 523 (1997). More than two hundred Supreme Court
opinions cite Cooley's treatises as authoritative.
442. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 11 (1996) (explaining that "[olur constitution is law,
and like all law it is anchored in history, practice, and integrity").
443. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 741, 754 (1999).
444. See Newsom, supra note 169, at 647.
445. See also AMAR, supra note 11, at 231-83 (developing a "refined" model
of incorporation). Compare Tribe, supra note 15, at 182-98 (advocating use of
Privileges or Immunities Clause to protect substantive rights, but expressing
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A more constructive reason reinforces the preference for
the historical and jurisprudential division between the clauses.
If we continue to understand that the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause embodies "negative" constitutional
constraints, while the Privileges or Immunities Clause
reinforces the protection of positive law, it becomes easier to
allocate institutional responsibilities of Congress and the courts
on that basis.
This approach embraces the historical
understanding that privileges connote positive law, and that
Congress has primary responsibility for development of that
law.
This thesis faces an implicit challenge from contemporary
Supreme Court declarations of state immunity from individual
claims for monetary damages based upon federal law; I,
however, do not need to second guess the justices' reasoning in
those cases since they responded to the questions they were
asked. I accept the Court's legitimate supervisory authority
over the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and in that context the majority
opinions in Florida Prepaid, Kimel, and Garrett fall within
legitimate boundaries of coherent constitutional doctrine.
These recent Supreme Court opinions conflict with this
Article's thesis only in a superficial sense.
Underlying
assumptions made in these cases-in particular, assumptions
regarding judicial responsibility for determining the scope of
negative constitutional constraints, while deferring to
legislative judgments regarding development of positive lawactually reinforce, rather than threaten, the thesis. Recall the
words of Chief Justice Rehnquist, that "special accommodations
for the disabled ... have to come from positive law and not
through the Equal Protection Clause."446 The Fourteenth
Amendment provides for positive as well as negative rights, but
it lies with Congress to develop the positive law rather than the
judicial bodies, which remain poorly suited to that task. At the
same time, the Amendment limits congressional control over
the substantive scope of negative constitutional constraints
based upon an understanding that legislators lack the
doubt that current Supreme Court doctrine will lead to that conclusion), with
Shankman & Pilon, supra note 13, at 2 (arguing that "a properly read and
applied clause will better protect individual rights," with particular emphasis
on property rights).
446. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001).
For discussion, see supra text accompanying notes 394-98.
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institutional competence to determine the substance of their
The rational basis test used to review
own constraints.
questions of discrimination based upon age or disability
illustrates this distinction. The principles that lead to judicial
deference to the legislature in this context, however, should not
be inverted to limit congressional actions when Congress acts
within the legitimate scope of its authority. Our Constitution
is not that perverse.
The Privileges or Immunities Clause empowers Congress
to enforce the positive law that it enacts. For this reason, the
constraints embodied by the Supreme Court decision in City of
Boerne v. Flores should not apply to congressional remedies
enacted pursuant to the Privileges or Immunities Clause. If, in
keeping with the admonition of the Chief Justice, the Supreme
Court's role in developing the positive law remains secondary,
then a search for "congruence and proportionality" would be
wholly out of place in a context designed for a determination of
appropriate scope of the positive law. As constitutional
doctrine illustrates, judicial review of privileges or immunities
derived from federal statutes should seek to root out only
irrationality. As long as no conflict exists with the applicable
negative constraints on government authority, this underlying
principle of judicial deference applies.
The real heart of the Supreme Court's recent Eleventh
Amendment doctrine lies in its insistence upon safeguarding
the independent authority of state governments. Justice Scalia
explains that the "honest textualist" should nevertheless be
guided by "the principle that federal interference with state
sovereign immunity is an extraordinary intrusion,"447 and the
Court's decision in Alden v. Maine embodies that principle. But
the current majority recognizes that the Fourteenth
Amendment, when properly construed, supercedes this
principle.
In Alden, Justice Kennedy explained that "in
adopting the Fourteenth Amendment, the people required the
States to surrender a portion of the sovereignty that had been
preserved to them by the original Constitution, so that
Congress may authorize private suits against nonconsenting
448
States pursuant to its section 5 enforcement power."
447. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role
of United States Federal Courts in Interpretingthe ConstitutionalLaws, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 28 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1997).

448. Alden, 527 U.S. at 756.
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Unfortunately, Justice Kennedy did not pause to consider the
tie between the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Privileges or
Immunities Clause.
I would not place primary blame on either the Court or the
litigants for failing to consider the Privileges or Immunities
Clause in Alden. The real fault lies with the academy, which
carries the responsibility for identifying and promoting the
constitutional canon. With his opinion in Slaughter-House,
Justice Miller provided a constitutional framework that offers a
remarkable degree of coherence and stability. We now verge on
losing those qualities by virtue of our failure to give Miller's
framework the respect it deserves.
The Slaughter-House framework I have described is thus
consistent with precedent and with traditional principles of
judicial deference to legislative development of positive law. It
is also consistent with contemporaneous federal statutory
language, and with Supreme Court interpretations of that
language. In 1870, when Congress referred to "any right or
privilege granted or secured.., by the Constitution or laws of
the United States,"449 it sought to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment. In 1980 and 1989, the Supreme Court construed
statutory protection of "rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws" 450 of the federal
government in the only way that makes linguistic sense-to
include protection of rights established by the Social Security
Act 45 ' and the National Labor Relations Act. 452 Unless
Congress understood its statutory language differently from
the same words used in the constitutional text, those decisions
establish binding authority for construing the Privileges or
Immunities Clause.
Finally, this approach provides coherence in one additional
sense. Though the terms "privileges" and "immunities" that
appear in Article IV and in the Fourteenth Amendment retain
consistent meaning, it lies with state and national legislatures
to develop their substance. In both contexts, the Supreme
Court's role remains secondary. 453 In both clauses, the terms
449.
450.
451.
452.
(1989).
453.
would

Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, 141 (1870).
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980).
Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 109
Although I describe the Court's role as secondary in both contexts, I
acknowledge a significant distinction. Because the Privileges and
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retain their historical meaning as references to positive law,
helping to guide this assignment of institutional responsibility.
States cannot abridge rights derived from federal legislation
any more than they can abridge the rights of new arrivals to
receive benefits defined by state law. 454

Failing to recognize

federal law as a source of privileges or immunities would
destroy this symmetry.
After the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment reinforced
federal supremacy. A review of text, context, contemporaneous
legislation, and more than a century of practice and precedent,
demonstrates this conclusion. To preserve the integrity of the
Constitution, courts should continue to recognize congressional
authority to establish and protect privileges or immunities of
United States citizens.

Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 imposes a negative constraint on
states, and because the Constitution does not include any form of subject
matter constraints on state legislation, there is a heightened need for the
Court to determine which state statutes fall within the ambit of "privileges
and immunities." The line drawn by the Court between commercial fishing
rights and sport hunting licenses illustrates this line drawing responsibility.
Compare Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 398-402 (1948) (striking down a
state requirement that non-residents obtain a commercial fishing license at
one hundred times the cost paid by state residents), with Baldwin v. Fish &
Game Comm'n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 391 (1978) (allowing the state to charge
a higher fee for nonresident hunting license). Comparable line drawing occurs
when the Court is asked to find violations of the dormant Commerce Clause,
which is another issue historically tied to privileges or immunities of United
States citizens. See Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 446 (1991) (finding
dormant Commerce Clause rights protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Crutcher v.
Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47, 57 (1891) (noting that "[t]o carry on interstate
commerce is not a franchise or a privilege granted by the State; it is a right
which every citizen of the United States is entitled to exercise under the
Constitution and laws of the United States").
454. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502 (1999).

